THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

Edited by the Rev. E. G. Selwyn, M.A., Redhill Rectory, Havant, to whom all editorial matters should be addressed.

Vol. VII OCTOBER, 1923 No. 40

EDITORIAL

AN IMPORTANT ISSUE

We are glad of the coincidence which has made it possible to publish in the same number the articles which stand in the names of Mr. Shebbeare and Mr. Spens respectively, for they deal with issues which are of obvious importance at the present moment in the Church of England.* Approaching matters from very different standpoints, both writers show themselves determined to see all that there is in the other side and to state it as fairly and fully as possible; and though the articles are written in complete independence of one another, and indeed are directed in the main to distinct aspects of the Eucharist, there is a considerable field where they overlap, even if they do not agree. Some at least of Mr. Shebbeare's questions are implicitly answered in Mr. Spens's article, and for that reason we suggest that the two contributions should be read in the order printed.

Mr. Shebbeare's article falls into three parts, dealing respectively with the "High Church" contribution to Eucharistic thought, the "Evangelical" contribution, and his own suggested summary.

Mr. Shebbeare urges that those who lay stress on the "objective" presence of our Lord in the Eucharist really mean that His presence is not "something created by our own imagination or our own piety" (p. 186). More precisely it means—and we think Mr. Shebbeare would agree—that Christ's presence in the Eucharist is conditioned and mediated by objects belonging to the external order. This does not require our saying that the Divine presence or operation in the Sacrament is "something entirely mysterious and unknowable" (p. 190). The existence of Eucharistic theology, and of Eastern and Western definitions, is proof that Catholic thought, at any rate, has not regarded this subject as one too sacred for the reverent exercise of reason. We believe, as Mr. Spens

* We venture also to draw attention to Mr. Lowther Clarke's masterly review of Wetter's book on Eucharistic origins, and to Mr. Bazeley's contribution from South Africa.

does, that analysis of symbolism offers the best approach to theological statement on the subject; and we have ourselves worked at it on these lines at some length elsewhere.*

A further point which Mr. Shebbeare finds implied in such Eucharistic prayers as invoke the power of God to effect some change in the elements is this—that the elements are not fortuitously chosen, but are superbly adapted to the purpose and lesson which Christ had in mind. That is true; but it is not the main idea in the Prayer of Consecration. That must be sought in the solemn investment of our Lord's Death with a sacrificial significance—*i.e.*, in what St. Paul calls the "showing forth" of His Death. This is one of those points where we venture to believe that Mr. Shebbeare's questions, so far as they are theological, are already met in Mr. Spens's article.

But we think that we should misunderstand Mr. Shebbeare if we supposed that his questions were only theological. We take it that his questions are really not so much theological as religious. The distinction is not easy to maintain; but perhaps we may put it this way. What do people *want*—what religious value are they conserving—when they think of Christ's presence and operation in the Eucharist as conditioned and mediated by objects in the external order? So long as we believe that God works upon our hearts and minds through the Eucharistic action, does much else matter? Need we regard the effect of consecration in the case of the Eucharistic elements as other than its effect in the case, say, of the water of Baptism? That, as we conceive it, is Mr. Shebbeare's fundamental question.

Now we desire to try to meet Mr. Shebbeare on the ground of his question. If we were to say that prayer for a change in the elements was an almost universal feature of ancient liturgies;† that it seemed already implied in the Prayer-Book formula of reconsecration and the direction as to consuming what is left of the consecrated elements; that the theological distinction between *sacramentum*, *res sacramenti*, and *virtus sacramenti* points to an instinctive idea in Christian thought that there *is* something in Eucharistic consecration which is not to be found in that, for instance, of the water of Baptism—if we were to say this, and to point for its ultimate authority to our Lord's words at the institution, then it would be quite open to Mr. Shebbeare to reply that he regarded this whole process of thought as due (among other causes) to erroneous exegesis. We do not mean, nor would Mr. Shebbeare contend, that right exegesis is not vitally important; but it is not the

* *John Forbes' Irenicum*, Book I. Appendix on "Eucharistic Symbolism and Adoration." (Cambridge University Press. 1923.)

† See *Twenty-Five Consecrative Prayers* (S.P.C.K.), and Mr. Cuthbert Atchley's article entitled "The Epiclesis" in THEOLOGY, vol. iii., No. 14 (August, 1921).

only factor of moment, nor the one which Mr. Shebbeare brings here to the fore. He asks what religious difference is made *now* by the belief that in Eucharistic consecration the elements are changed. That is what we will try shortly to consider, and to consider in close connection with Mr. Spens's article.

The burden of Mr. Spens's thesis is that the expiatory and sacrificial significance of the Death of Christ is bound up with the institution, and so with the celebration, of the Eucharist. That a victim's death should be a sacrifice, it is necessary that it should be accompanied by certain "sacerdotal acts"; and it is these which our Lord performed and provided for at the Last Supper. He was there the Priest, as He was so shortly to be the Victim. These acts are the whole Eucharistic rite focussed especially in Consecration and Communion. We are glad that Mr. Spens has so plainly pointed out (p. 207) that the offering of the Sacrifice is not some separate act from the Communion. It may be indicated, for teaching purposes, by some separate ceremony such as the elevation of the elements; but that is not essential. What is essential is Consecration and Communion. It will be seen, moreover, how congruous Mr. Spens's doctrine is both with the words of institution and with the language of St. Paul; how it avoids the errors of Transubstantiation; and how entirely it agrees with the New Testament insistence, so rightly emphasized by Evangelicals, upon the completeness and finality of our Lord's Death on the Cross.

But now suppose we take away from Mr. Spens's exposition all that he says (pp. 195 ff.) about the Eucharistic symbolism being "effectual" as well as "dramatic" or "didactic," and being a symbolism of objects as well as of action—a point which seems implied also in at least one passage of Mr. Shebbeare's article (pp. 188, 193). What then is lost? What is lost is surely just that fusing of spiritual with natural experience, which not only transfigures and dignifies natural experience, but in the long run reacts upon our whole conception of the potentialities of the external order. In other words, what is lost is something in our conception of God. It does make a difference whether you think of matter as essentially non-significant for religion, and divorced from all contact with the supernatural, or as something capable of being charged with an ultimate and fundamental relation to heavenly things. Mr. Shebbeare makes full allowance for a symbolism of action in religion, and for a choice of objects perfectly adapted to the symbolic action; but it is the action rather than the objects which he allows to be charged with supernatural significance. Yet what we need is not only something to do, but something also for our eyes to

see and our hands to handle. That is the need which the Incarnation met, and in meeting sanctified. Yet we could not regard it as fully met for us, if this seeing and handling had ended with the last of the Resurrection appearances. "Touch me not: for I am not yet ascended. . . ." Does it not mean that there was to be a new and closer contact following upon the Ascension? Christ is not incarnate in the Blessed Sacrament: but the Blessed Sacrament is what it is by reason of the Incarnation and the Ascension; of the Incarnation, because the visible and the tangible was there made to be the very Body and dwelling-place of God the Son; of the Ascension, because those limits of time and place which conditioned His incarnate Life were done away, and the way opened for new modes in which His presence should be vouchsafed.

With all that Mr. Shebbeare says of our Lord's spiritual presence we need hardly say that we are wholly in agreement. And if he should say that the presence in the Spirit is the most essential upshot of the Ascension—that Pentecost is the central and primary issue of the Divine operation which began at the Nativity—with that, too, we should agree. But the dispensation of the Spirit did not do away with those other modes of God's presence on which the Incarnation had set His seal. God did not raise hopes simply to dash them to the ground, nor satisfy longings that for ever after were to go hungry. Rather is the spiritual presence the ground of, not the substitute for, those other means of His drawing near which we call the Mystical Presence and the Sacramental Presence. Some would say that the East has been specially called to treasure and witness to the first of these, and the Latin West to the second; while the English Church, and Evangelical religion (where it has really stuck to the Gospel), have clung peculiarly to the truth of the spiritual presence, without which the other two truths are so easily debased. Be that as it may, we cannot belittle or repress that need which St. John has voiced in the first verse of his first Epistle, nor believe that its satisfaction is without value in the spiritual life.

We need not deal at length with the second main issue of Mr. Shebbeare's article—that which concerns the liberty of the Christian man; though the foregoing paragraphs indicate what our view would be. If God in His love has provided a way of grace, the Church can but teach and urge it on all who desire to do His will: the rest we can leave in His just and merciful hands. There is surely nothing here which should make us regret the Church of England's clear and firm adhesion to the view that the Eucharist is an ordained means of grace and its use the normal means of obtaining the grace therein offered.

QUESTIONS ON THE EUCHARISTIC PRESENCE

THREE of the forms of Communion Service which have recently been under discussion—those in the "Green book," the "Grey book," and the book of 1549—contain a prayer which asks (or seems to ask) for a change in the elements—an "internal change" in the "elements themselves." "With Thy Holy Spirit and word vouchsafe to bless and sanctify these Thy gifts and creatures of bread and wine, that they may be unto us the Body and Blood of Thy most dearly beloved Son Jesus Christ."* "With Thy Holy Spirit bless and sanctify both us and these Thy gifts of Bread and Wine, that we receiving them according to Thy Son our Saviour Jesus Christ's holy institution may be partakers of His most blessed Body and Blood."†

As an Evangelical I am suspicious of such language. Though I say this, I do not think that the problems involved are simple and easy. I am well aware, and so is every student of the Hegelian logic, of the difficult questions that can be asked when we use words such as "internal," "inward," "in itself." Again, it may be said that no objection can be raised against a prayer for the blessing of the Eucharistic elements which is not equally valid against the familiar Grace before meals: "Bless this food to our use." All such arguments must be respectfully considered. None the less, when it is suggested that language such as I have quoted should be allowed to replace the familiar language of the Prayer-Book, one may lawfully ask what are the theological motives for this change.

I am very far indeed from suggesting that these motives are bad ones. On the contrary, I believe that they are genuinely religious motives: that this changed language is desired because it seems to give expression to beliefs apart from which the Eucharist loses some of its religious value. Indeed, the tragedy of the present position appears to me to be in the main a tragedy of misunderstanding. Great and true principles are being contended for by both the rival schools of thought: and, as I happen to have had much friendly discussion of these subjects with High Churchmen of various types, it has occurred to me that I may possibly be able to contribute something to the removal of misunderstandings, if I merely set down on paper what I have gathered to be the great fundamental principles which, in the eyes of the two contending schools, are the real matters at issue. To interpret other men's thought

* Report of E. C. U. Committee, p. 72 : See Prayer-Book of 1549.
† A New Prayer-Book (Foreword by Bishop of Manchester), p. 15.

in one's own language is a delicate task. Yet the attempt may be made without offence where the need of mutual understanding is so great.

I. I will first state, as well as I can, those positions—of vital importance to High Churchmen—which they take to be implicitly denied in Evangelical teaching on the Eucharist.

(A) A good man once alleged that he was "a Zwinglian perhaps, as regards the elements, but not as regards the Sacrament in general." His meaning was, I imagine, that he repudiated the notion of the Eucharist as a bare memorial of a past event. When a preacher spoke of our Lord as leaving behind Him "this touching little memorial," his High Church critics protested that this language was not merely inadequate, but an outrage. For them each day's Eucharist is a fresh activity of God in the soul, a vital incident of that day's spiritual life.

(B) The affirmation that there is in the Eucharist an "objective" presence is primarily a denial that the Eucharistic presence of Christ is something created by our own imagination or our own piety. Someone quoted in this connection the words—

> These ever bring Thee when they come,
> And going take Thee to their home.

If the lines mean simply that God ever dwells in and with His people, no objection can be raised. But, applied to the faithful communicant, they appear to ignore, if not to deny, that there is in the sacrament any *gift* of God. The communicant is represented as *bringing* the Divine presence rather than as *receiving* it. We are even told sometimes that Evangelicals—in spite of their protestations of loyalty to the Pauline doctrines—are here convicted of a reliance on their own good works.

> If the Eucharistic presence is objective [it is said], then Christ comes to us despite the inadequacy of our faith and the poverty of our achievement. But if it is subjective, or even subjectively conditioned, what can this mean but that He comes to the pious and the good, or (in other words), that the presence of Christ is merely the existence in us of the Christ-like character: a mere phrase expressive of our own goodness?

This argument, though sometimes impressively stated, seems to evince a certain confusion of thought. On any theory there must be *subjective conditions* of Christ's presence in the soul. Christ cannot dwell in the impenitent. On any theory forgiveness and grace must be divine gifts. Thus the true antithesis is not that of "subjective" and "objective"—any Christian theory, to express itself fully, must admit both these aspects: the real contrast is rather between those who con-

ceive the reception of the gifts of God as conditioned by our goodness (as did the Pharisee in the parable), and those who (like the Publican) conceive it as conditioned by penitence pure and simple. Goodness and penitence are both "subjective states." But in the distinction between them lies the difference between Pharisaism and Christianity. Yet, even if we are right in suspecting that the phrase an "objective presence" may sometimes cover confused thinking and a false antithesis, it is important to recognize that the High Churchman's fear of the doctrine of a purely "subjective" presence in the Eucharist is based ultimately upon the same conviction as has produced the Evangelical's hostility to the doctrine of Justification by Works. "However cold my feelings, however weak my hold on the verities of the faith, Christ gives Himself to me in the Eucharist, and my defects are of no account." It is in such language that the doctrine of an objective presence is defended, when the defence is religious rather than theological. Such language the Evangelical cannot feel to be wholly alien to his own faith. "Willie Booth," said one whose words had a lifelong influence on the lad who was later to found the Salvation Army, "do you know that religion is something that comes into us from outside of us?"

(C) The High Churchman is in protest, thirdly, against any language which treats the Eucharistic elements as in themselves unimportant and indifferent. There are those who say that all externals are matters of individual taste and association—that whereas one man is brought to God in the Eucharist, the same effect is produced on another by the Quakers' meeting, on another by a solo from the *Messiah*, on another by a sermon, or it may be by the gentle influence of the forest and the blue dome of Heaven. Now few men would deny that God may work in varied manners—by music, by eloquence, by silence—nor should we deny that if penitence is produced by these means, penitence must bring salvation. But that—we should feel—is not quite the point. The choice of the elements of bread and wine for use in the Eucharistic context may well rank in our minds as a supreme touch of genius comparable with the invention of the Parable of the Pharisee and the Publican or of the Prodigal Son. If the Eucharist had never been instituted, or if once instituted the Church had not seen fit to perpetuate it, no one can doubt the greatness of the loss to mankind. To recognize that this loss would have been precisely what we call a "spiritual" loss—a loss of God's nearness and presence—is surely in no way inconsistent with Evangelical principles.

(D) Again, the sacrificial language used by High Church-

men in this connection implies that the gift received in the Eucharist is God, and God as Victim: "Himself the Victim and Himself the Priest." The suggestion—made by a distinguished Evangelical—that if our eyes were opened we should see Christ "not on the table, but at it," was unwelcome to High Churchmen, and not to High Churchmen only, for the very reason that it removed from a central place in Eucharistic theology the conception of the Divine Victim.

(E) Again, language like that of Father Dalgairns* expresses a view which many Anglicans, though they might not themselves use the words, regard with sympathy, and even regard as vital to the true conception of the Sacrament. "Union of hearts is not enough. . . . We must be able to say to ourselves precisely, 'That is not bread, but the Body of Jesus. In the little round of the consecrated Host is He contained. Here is my Lord and not there. He is in the tabernacle before which I bend. He is within me now.'" Here speaks not merely faith in Christ, but also an affectionate attachment to the "little round of consecrated bread." It is a simple truth—not always recognized—that attachment to Christ's Sacrament leads naturally to an attachment to all that belongs to it. If I say: "To me Christ is everything, the externals nothing," I make a false abstraction. If the elements were thus uninteresting, whence their manifest fitness for their holy purpose?

The question, then, which I wish to put is simple. Is it possible that under each of these headings we have the expression of a religious conception—a religious demand—which is in its essence reconcilable with the faith of Evangelical Christians, although it is commonly expressed in language which Evangelicals reject?

II. The answer can best be given, perhaps, if we briefly reflect upon the positive principles which an Evangelical may regard as endangered by the Eucharistic teaching of High Churchmen.

(A) The phrase that the two Sacraments are "generally necessary to salvation" would, if taken literally, conflict directly with the belief that an internal state of mind—penitence—is the necessary, but the sole, condition of pardon. The declaration that "there can be no such person as an unpardoned penitent" may well be regarded as the very essence of the Gospel. It is so regarded by many besides those who are commonly called Evangelicals. Indeed, no one has given more striking expression to this view than the late

* *The Holy Communion.* (James Duffy. Dublin, 1868. Third edition, p. 111.)

Dr. Robert Moberley. Yet its disagreement with the assertion of the absolute necessity of Sacraments to salvation is obvious. The common explanation that the salvation of, say, the Quaker is to be placed in the category of the "uncovenanted mercies" can find no favour with the Evangelical, to whom the acceptance and forgiveness of the penitent, as such, appears to be the very essence of the Christian Covenant.

(B) Just as in the preaching of the Gospel the High Churchman and the Evangelical find themselves using the same language (language which it is at least *prima facie* difficult to reconcile with High Church teaching on the Sacraments), so in defending prayer against the objections of unbelievers the two schools find themselves frequently at one.

> Prayer [they would agree to say] is no unmoral attempt to win the divine favour, as if God were to be won by flattery or could be led by motives of favouritism. Prayer brings gifts and graces which God would not otherwise bestow, because it develops and expresses the frame of mind which fits us to receive them, or to use them. If God is good, then, if He withholds from man gifts in themselves good, His reason for withholding them must be a reason consistent with His goodness. No *arbitrary* withholding of good is consistent with goodness: but if we maintain that in certain cases God waits, not till we are *worthy* of His gifts but till we are *fit* to receive them with benefit, there is no arbitrariness in such procedure.

If it is true that, on one side,* every Sacrament is an "acted prayer" (of the individual and of the community), then in our theory of prayer we can find a basis for our theology of the Sacraments. Indeed, even apart from this connection, certain results for Sacramental theology follow directly from the belief that God acts always in accordance with the dictates of His own inherent goodness and therefore is incapable of arbitrary demands. With this faith the conception of the Sacraments as binding on us in virtue of a "positive command" is plainly inconsistent. If God's supreme commandment is that law on which hang all the law and the prophets, then every obligation which binds us binds us for an intelligible reason. If we are God's "friends"—not "servants who know not what their Lord doeth"—then there can be nothing ultimately unintelligible, nothing absolutely mysterious, in the Divine commands. Christian liberty is based on the conviction that we know the character of goodness and of God, and therefore understand the reason for all our service.

(C) It is in accordance with this conception of God to regard the divine presence in the Eucharist as intelligible in its nature. We know *why* we ought to seek it; we know therefore *what*

* On another side it is an acted *promise;* a declaration, which the Church is commissioned to make, that all penitents receive pardon and grace.

we are seeking; and is not this the same thing as to say that God's presence in our souls is not merely spiritually conditioned, but is *itself a fact in the realm of spiritual—i.e.*, of moral and religious—*experience?* Such a view does not make the presence "merely subjective" in any irreligious sense. The law that "if we seek God's presence we find it" is objectively true. It is no creation of ours. But can the Divine presence be verified except in spiritual experience? and if not, can it be reasonably defined except in terms of such experience?

There is, as we know, a tendency to speak of the Divine presence or operation in this and other sacraments as of some thing entirely mysterious and unknowable. A woman who in her youth had received Anglican Confirmation complained that at her Confirmation she had "felt nothing, except a little nervousness," and seemed in consequence to have no great opinion of that ordinance. She had in mind, no doubt, some of those New Testament scenes (*e.g.*, Acts x. 47) in which the Spirit's presence is made known by sensible evidence. We are all familiar with the arguments which the more old-fashioned High Churchman would use in dealing with such an objection. "God," he would say, "may, if He chooses, give sensible evidence of His presence: but you have no right to expect this evidence in either of the two senses in which the word 'sensible' is used. You have no right to expect either a signal glow of inward emotion and illumination: nor such visible manifestations as cloven tongues of fire." So far, no doubt, we shall all be in agreement. But if the High Church apologist proceeds—as he sometimes does—to speak of a Divine presence or operation which is not merely not *sensible*, but which is not *verifiable* in any way, then surely he is tacitly ignoring the promise that those who "seek" shall "find." Yet have we not all heard Infant Baptism defended (against those who point out that in many who receive it there is no *evidence* of any Divine gift—that in children till they come to a certain age there *can* be no such evidence) by the argument that, like the coins "laid up in a napkin," the Holy Spirit may be present and yet unused, that the Gift may be "there"—in the soul—yet inoperative and dormant? Would it not be just to reply that the Spirit is rather to be compared to a fire than to a mass of metal, to something active than to something inert; that a fire cannot be laid up in a napkin; that if the Holy Spirit is present in a human soul this presence cannot be inoperative? Surely then we must justify Infant Baptism —not by alleging some instantaneous but mysterious change in the soul of the child at the moment of its immersion, a change that eludes all observation—but rather by pointing to

the effect of Infant Baptism as an institution upon the mind and soul of the community in which it is faithfully administered, and hence in course of time upon the child whom that community receives into itself. On this side the evidence is sufficient and ample. The greatest of all the achievements, perhaps, of the Oxford Movement is the changed attitude—which can be in great measure traced to its influence—of religious men towards childhood and children. It is at any rate more encouraging to a child to be told, "*Noblesse oblige:* you are a child of God: you must not soil the purity of your baptismal robe," than to regard himself exclusively as by nature a "child of wrath, a vessel of wrath fitted for destruction"—although this darker aspect of his position cannot safely be ignored altogether.

Our natural conclusion will be that the Divine presence—whether conceived as the presence of the Holy Ghost in the soul, or as the presence of Christ in the Sacrament—is to be regarded as something intelligible, verifiable, a fact in the realm of conscious experience.

III. Consider now the bearing of those reflections upon the question whether we may rightly pray for a change in the Eucharistic elements at the moment of consecration. An eminent layman recently suggested that common ground between Evangelicals and Catholics might be found in the belief that the bread and wine stand, in the Holy Communion, in a changed relation to our Lord—a relation "unique and mysterious." But the whole question surely turns upon the kind of change we affirm.

If paper and ink are used to produce a copy of the Gospels, we might (if we chose) say that this paper and this ink had gained new powers, powers unique (since Christian conversion is like nothing else in the world) and mysterious (since no one can sound the depths of the religious experience which the study of the Gospels may produce). We may, in a similar sense, attribute "new powers"—a "changed relation to our Lord," if we prefer this phrase—to the bread and wine when employed in the Eucharistic context. Yet it is only fair to point out that, if this is our meaning, the language quoted above (from the Green book, the Grey book, and the book of 1549) is not well fitted to express it. It would be most unnatural English to say that the paper or the ink which have brought the message of salvation, and thereby salvation itself, to the soul of the reader, had themselves undergone a change. It would be more natural to remark that these substances were in themselves unchanged, though the purpose for which we employ them has made them instruments of so tremendous a spiritual revolution.

What, then, is the kind of change in the bread and wine which those who wish to return to the language of 1549 have in mind? Various answers may be given. Someone may say, "What I believe is that, quite simply and literally, the bread becomes the body of the Lord. I don't understand the manner of the change: I cannot understand how it takes place. I simply accept the *fact* that this bread *is*—as He said—His body." Yet obviously we cannot treat the identification as quite simple and literal. We cannot say without qualification that the bread in every sense *is*—or even *becomes*—the body of Christ. "*Species sacramentales*," says St. Thomas, "*frangi possunt in sacramento: non autem frangitur Christi corpus.*"* It is, indeed, only necessary to read the treatment by St. Thomas of the questions of "substance" and "dimensive quantity"† to see how many distinctions must needs be drawn, which are quite inconsistent with the notion that we are here using terms in a sense that is either literal or simple. Again, there are senses in which we should all *deny* Christ's presence in the Eucharist. He is not present in any sense which would conflict with the text, "It is expedient for you that I go away."

There are those, again, who might be attracted by the doctrine that "our Lord can see us from the Host with His bodily eyes, and hear us with His outward ears," that our Lord's body would be "dead in the Blessed Sacrament unless He in some way makes use of His senses."‡ Here at least is a definite and, up to a point, an intelligible assertion, though the view is not likely to commend itself to many Anglicans.

A third answer is that we may distinguish the *fact* from the *manner*, and are in no way bound to give any explanation of the latter. Yet reflection, surely, will show that this is not a question of explaining how something happens. The question is as to *what* we are asserting. It is quite incredible that anyone should admit that he is contending earnestly for a statement of which he does not know the meaning. Again, if we maintain that Christ is present in the Eucharist in *some* sense, but we do not know in *what* sense, we cannot then deny that He may be present in the sense mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The practical consequences of such an admission, if taken seriously, are such, surely, as no Christian could approve. We should find ourselves in the spiritual position of the pagan who fears that he may injure or offend the divine powers by trespassing unwittingly on the sacred enclosure. It is not necessary to develop this argument in detail.

I venture, then, to suggest that the view which treats the

* *Summa Theol.*, section pars. 77. 7. † See III., Qu. 76, art. 1.
‡ Dalgairns, *The Holy Communion*, third edition, pp. 135, 141.

sacramental presence as a fact in spiritual experience—to be described by use of the categories of our moral and religious life, personal and collective—is the view which will be found in the end to be most in accordance with the real beliefs of High Churchmen themselves. That those who speak most of spiritual experience take sometimes a view of the Eucharist which is sadly cold and lamentably individualistic must be admitted. If the High Churchman says, "All that you hold about the Eucharist in your best moments we hold too, but we hold more besides," he is often right. Yet I still suggest that the "more" which he knows is "more of the same kind" —something which belongs to the realm of spiritual experience, the experience of the individual and of the Church.

"If," said a devout clergyman, "all that happens in the Eucharist is a change in our frame of mind, why do we need any act of consecration at all?" If we answered that the consecration assists to *produce* the required state of mind, the answer would give a wrong impression. It would suggest that we regarded the consecration as a mere device to work upon the feelings and stir the imagination. But if we regard the Eucharistic elements in their whole context—if we think of them as an essential part of a rite which, human nature being what it is, is the most effective method conceivable by which the soul can be prepared for God, if we think, not of feelings and imaginations only, but of the acts of faith and will, of self-examination and self-surrender, which the Eucharist calls forth—then surely we may admit the necessary part which the elements play in our spiritual life without assuming any physical or quasi-physical change, any local or quasi-local presence, in the bread and wine; and also without asserting some change which is wholly mysterious, neither physical nor mental, about which all that we can say is that it can be described by no intelligible category whatsoever. That the Eucharistic presence is "objective," that the elements play a vital part in bringing this presence to our souls, are the two beliefs which seem to be the most prominent in the devotional literature of High Churchmen. If we recognize that without external signs common life is impossible; if we recognize that the elements in their context have a unique power to direct the mind and the will to Christ; if we hold it truth that Christ died for mankind, and that the certain result of those dispositions which the Eucharist calls forth is the reception of those gifts which are the fruits of His redemption, are we not admitting in essence the beliefs for which High Churchmen most earnestly contend?

CHARLES J. SHEBBEARE.

THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE*

This book has an interest out of proportion to its length. It is an earnest plea for recognition by Evangelical Churchmen that error is involved and loss results if the sacrificial character of the Eucharist is not recognized. This is combined with a discussion of the way in which the Eucharist can properly be regarded as a sacrifice. The author is obviously well aware that his conclusions on the latter question would not be accepted as satisfactory by most of those who maintain the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. In his turn he criticizes, and criticizes often in a very telling manner, presentations of that doctrine current among Roman or Anglican divines. Legitimate Protestant objections to such presentations are far more likely to receive due weight, and thus to bring about an adequate synthesis, when Evangelicals and High Churchmen are arguing not whether the Eucharist is a sacrifice, but about the sense in which it is a sacrifice. The importance of Canon Guy's book lies in his whole-hearted adoption and advocacy of this view of the problem.

I imagine that the response which Canon Guy would most wish to secure from a reviewer, who writes from a different standpoint, would consist less in a formal notice than in a discussion of his objections to traditional theories of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, and still more in an attempt, however tentative, so to state the doctrine in question as to meet such of these objections as are well founded. It is because Canon Guy's eirenicon appears to call for no less serious a reply that I have ventured to attempt the latter task, and this review has, in consequence, been too long delayed. For this delay I tender my apologies.

A discussion of the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice cannot be separated, save with the certainty of misunderstanding, from a clear statement of the meaning which the writer assigns to our Lord's description of the bread which He had broken and the cup which He had blessed as His Body and His Blood. For this reason I propose to state as briefly as possible what I conceive to be the meaning and implications of the phrases in question.

It is very difficult to reject the usual Protestant contention that here, as on other occasions, our Lord may have used metaphorical language, and that, in consequence, His words

* *Steps towards Inter-Communion, Sacrifice in Relation to Holy Communion.* By the Rev. D. S. Guy, Hon. Canon of Ripon, Vicar of Christ Church, Harrogate. 1921.

cannot be assumed to assert a metaphysical identity between the Eucharistic Gifts and His Body and Blood. On the other hand, if a metaphorical interpretation is sought, a particular interpretation appears to me to be inevitable, and to involve in the last resort all which Catholic thought demands, while yielding this in such a form as to be free from any charge of materialism. The words of institution, as given in the Gospels and by St. Paul, the fact that they were spoken under the shadow of the Passover, and the reference to the New Covenant, force us to interpret our Lord's meaning by reference to sacrificial conceptions. In light of current sacrificial conceptions the natural meaning of our Lord's phrase, " Take, eat. This is My Body," and of the corresponding, although even more startling, phrase as to His Blood, was surely that in receiving the bread which He had broken and the cup which He had blessed the Apostles were made partakers in a sacrifice, and thereby in the blessings of a sacrifice, in which He was the victim. Our Lord's words to the Apostles must have meant at the very least that their eating and drinking represented participation in such a sacrifice, and it is very doubtful whether, even apart from other passages and without a hopeless anachronism, we could limit, in this way merely to *dramatic* symbolism, the natural meaning of our Lord's words. The much quoted parallel, " This is the bread of affliction," is attractive, but gives no real support for the limitation. In the first place, it has not the direct sacrificial associations of our Lord's words, and it is in regard to sacrifice that the idea of *effectual* symbolism was in all probability most current. In the second place, it is very doubtful if even the rite in question can have been regarded as mere play-acting, as in no sense mediating a participation with the Israel of the Exodus. In any case St. Paul's language makes clear, all the more clear in view of the familiarity of his readers with mystery religions, that he regarded the Eucharist as a sacrament in the Prayer-Book sense, as determining and not merely representing spiritual results; and in a discussion which has primarily in mind orthodox Evangelical thought it is not necessary to present an argument that on such a point, and in a letter preserved in the Scriptures, St. Paul did not gravely misinterpret his Master's meaning.

Nor is it possible to separate participation in a sacrifice and in the blessings of a sacrifice. Current thought may well have recognized that only right-minded participation in a sacrifice secured spiritual blessings, and that these would be afforded to right desire when ritual participation was not reasonably possible. But once more we are surely guilty of an anachronism if we deny that in so far as a sacrifice was

conceived as securing a blessing, ritual participation *in an appointed manner* would have been held both to mediate and normally to condition participation in the blessing so secured. Here also St. Paul's teaching serves, both directly and indirectly, to place this view beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt.

To sum up: I am simply concerned so far to assert that our Lord's language means that to those who worthily receive the broken bread and the cup there is vouchsafed participation in the blessings of His Sacrifice; that, in the language of our formularies, there is not merely an outward and visible sign, but an inward and spiritual grace, which initially may be thus defined. More is, however, at once implied. Participation in the blessings of Christ's Sacrifice involves and depends on participation in His life; and the language and symbolism which our Lord employed were well calculated to suggest also this further idea. The Eucharistic Gifts afford the opportunity not only of participation in the blessings secured on Calvary, but, what is inseparable, of participation in the life of Christ.

So far I venture to hope that neither Canon Guy nor other Evangelical theologians of his school would feel concerned to dispute what I have said, or would regard it as specially characteristic of those opinions to which they are opposed. In common with the teaching of the Prayer-Book I have asserted that the Eucharist is a Sacrament in the sense that the Divine Will has attached to an outward and visible sign a spiritual grace, or rather an opportunity for grace. If I have gone beyond the Catechism at all it is, I conceive, in recognizing that in the Eucharist the symbolism, the effectual symbolism, is primarily a symbolism of objects rather than as in baptism a symbolism of action. We receive the grace of communion through worthy reception of the bread which has been broken and the cup which has been blessed rather than through eating bread and drinking a cup. Here, if I touch a point which is not explicit in the Catechism, the view I have put is presupposed by the English Liturgy, and in particular by the rubric as to reconsecration. In and through consecration the Eucharistic Gifts come to afford a spiritual opportunity—namely, that their devout and worthy reception secures participation in the blessings of Christ's Sacrifice and in His life. It was in our Lord's power to give such participation; He does give it, as we believe, to those who worthily and devoutly receive the Sacramental Gifts.

I can best make clear how much appears to me to be involved, if the spiritual opportunity is thus associated with particular objects, by a somewhat lengthy quotation from a

statement of the implications as they appeared to us which I published with the well-known writer on the philosophy of religion who employs the pseudonym "Hakluyt Egerton":*

In the first place, the bread and wine are changed by consecration. They acquire a new property, namely, that their devout reception secures and normally conditions participation in the blessings of Christ's sacrifice, and, therefore, in His life. It is true that this occurs simply in and through their becoming effectual symbols, but wherever the significance of an effectual symbol is certain and considerable, we naturally think of it in terms of that significance, as well as in terms of its natural properties. We do not carefully separate in thought the natural properties of a florin and its purchasing value; rather, we combine the two, and we think of the florin, quite simply as an object which has certain natural properties and a certain purchasing value. We tend to think of the latter as to all intents and purposes a property of the object; yet it depends simply and solely on the fact that the object is an effectual symbol. The case for a similar view of the Eucharistic symbols is, of course, infinitely stronger. In the first place, the Eucharistic character of the objects turns more directly on the connection between a certain act—to wit, devout reception—and certain results: and the certainty of this connection is identical with the certainty of those potential sequences between action and effect which constitute the natural properties of a physical thing. The Eucharistic sequences and the natural sequences are both grounded in the Divine Will. In and through consecration, the complexes of properties which we call bread and wine are changed, not by any change in their original properties, but by the addition of new properties which are equally ultimate and have far greater significance.

Such a view may be challenged on either of two grounds, but neither is satisfactory. It may be challenged on the ground that our spiritual experience is essentially independent of, and separable from, our natural experience. A spiritual experience is, of course, more than any natural experience: but, here on earth, it would appear not infrequently to involve a natural experience as a part in the whole. Any other view involves a dualism between matter and spirit which Christian thought has steadily rejected, and contradicts a wide range of facts which illustrate the part played by external things—*e.g.*, rites—in mediating religious experience. The other ground for objection lies in the fact that faith is required to take advantage of the opportunities of spiritual nourishment which the sacramental objects afford. Natural nourishment involves, however, no less than spiritual, an active assimilation; and the only difference is that, in the latter case, a conscious effort is required. In each case the specific opportunity is afforded by the object.

Nor has the pre-existing association of certain opportunities of natural experience, which we call bread and wine, a basis in any degree more fundamental than the further association, established at consecration, of certain opportunities of spiritual experience. Whether we consider the spiritual and natural properties in respect of the ground of their existence or the ground of their association, we are driven to the same conclusion. Only if we lapse into the mistake of regarding natural sequences as constituted otherwise than by the Divine Will, can

* *A Cross Bench View of the Reservation Controversy* (pamphlet, Faith Press).

we regard the physical properties of the Eucharistic symbols as more fundamental, or more characteristic, than their distinctively Eucharistic properties. Consequently, it is only if we treat physical experience as specially important or significant that we can accept as our truest point of view one from which Host and Chalice seem to be primarily physical. The Eucharistic symbols render our Lord appropriable in a visible rite as our Sacrifice, as our Sacrificial Food. To insist that such objects should be described as merely bread and wine amounts to insistence that our thought and language should be determined exclusively by physical experience. Denial of a change at consecration is so far from avoiding materialism that it presupposes and tends to confirm a materialistic outlook.

The bearing of all this on the doctrine of the Real Presence needs little development. Host and Chalice are objects of which the most significant properties involve and depend on our Lord's being and His glorified Humanity—objects in and through which He is our Sacrificial Food—objects which, in consequence, make possible a more intimate relation to Him than did even His natural Body when He walked upon the earth. Our Lord is everywhere present and to be adored, but if He stood once more upon earth in His natural Body, it is quite certain that we would not be satisfied with paying Him an adoration which had no external expression. It is quite certain that we would kneel towards His Body in our worship of Him. And that to which we knelt, what would it be? An object which possessed characteristic properties dependent on His Being and Humanity, and which made possible a certain relation to Him. His sacramental Body and Blood have equally significant and equally ultimate properties—properties which depend on His Being and His now glorified Humanity, and consequently express His very Self. And the relation to Him which they make possible is indescribably more intimate than any relation which His natural Body, once visible on earth, could afford. The Sacrament of the Altar represents, in consequence, a special occasion for adoration and a legitimate focus for its expression.

In regard to these quotations I would wish to make one observation. I am well aware that theologians and ecclesiastics who normally command our deep respect are content to decry the devotional value of practices which are based on the doctrine of the Real Presence. I have in mind particular phrases which directly imply that worship of our Lord in His sacramental presence is simply a new form of idolatry. I have to confess that such language staggers me by its presumption, that I find it reminding me of those Jewish ecclesiastics who were led by their religious prejudices and conservatism to ascribe to Satanic agency our Lord's miracles. That the Eucharistic cultus has often involved gross superstition is undeniable; but it is surely no more deniable that it has so assisted the souls of men and women of such sanctity and such intelligence as to render language of this sort at best puerile and on occasion blasphemous. No Eucharistic theology is adequate which does not avoid superstition or materialism

in a way which is not secured in much current exposition; but, so far as I can see, no Eucharistic theology can be adequate which does not reconcile with legitimate Protestant objections Catholic experiences of the type I have indicated. The view indicated in the above quotations may help, as the authors hope and believe, to such a synthesis, or it may not; the need for a synthesis stands far clearer. What is at issue is not indeed whether the Eucharistic cultus has no relation to idolatry, but whether it supplies in one direction, as the Incarnation supplies in another, a *legitimate* satisfaction for that deep-rooted aspiration and need which led to idolatry. If Catholic thought must give much more weight to Protestant objections, is it too much to plead that Evangelical and moderate thought should give more weight to Catholic experience and should cease to belittle the significance of this ?

Not the least merit of Canon Guy's book, and not the least claim which it has on the gratitude of High Churchmen, is its freedom from that temper of mind to which I have referred. Uncompromising as is his criticism of current doctrines of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, his whole attitude presupposes that behind these lies something true and valuable which must first be freed from misstatement and then appropriated. Canon Guy holds that Roman doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice fails to do justice to the finality of the Sacrifice on Calvary. He scarcely allows enough for the fact that the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice has not been defined by the Roman Catholic Church with any completeness, and for forms of that doctrine advanced by Roman theologians which go far to meet this objection. I can see no way by which to challenge the criticism if it is restated in the form that Roman Catholic theology does not sufficiently safeguard the truth at issue. The wide currency of doctrine of the type advanced by Cardinal de Lugo and Cardinal Franzelin can scarcely be denied. It is difficult to maintain that the finality of the Sacrifice on the Cross is secured on the ground that the Mass is one with the Sacrifice on the Cross because there is the same priest and the same Victim, when the Mass is held to be a Sacrifice precisely on the ground that it involves a further act of the nature of, or comparable with, an act of destruction.

On the other hand, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Roman theology is right in an analysis of sacrifice which regards as an essential element some change in that which is offered, and a change which normally at least is of the nature of destruction, or that it is, again, right when it distinguishes a sacrifice from other offerings to God by the presence and significance of such a change. Students of Comparative

Religion, working from a different standpoint with wholly different interests, reach the same conclusion; for example, when defining a sacrifice as differing from other rites involving the consecration of objects " in that the object is destroyed as part of the rite." Nor is it easy to resist the conclusion that Roman theology is also right in preserving a Christocentric view of the Mass by insisting that, if it is a sacrifice, it is because Christ is there the object of a sacrificial act, and by refusing to be content with the idea that there is an offering of bread and wine. Whatever value that idea may possess in a subordinate place, and to this point I shall have occasion to return, neither the records of the institution nor devotional experience allow us to treat it as central. If in the Mass our Lord does not " come to be our Sacrifice " as well as " to be given as food to the Faithful," then the Mass can only be said to be a sacrifice in a sense which is so subordinate and secondary, and which is so different from that entertained by Roman or Orthodox theology, as to make the description at best misleading. We are placed, therefore, in the position that unless in the Eucharist Christ is the object of a sacrificial act whereby He can be said to become our Sacrifice, it is a sacrifice only in a very secondary sense; that an act effecting a change which is normally at least of the nature of destruction is an essential element in a sacrifice; that in consequence the Mass can only be termed a sacrifice in any primary sense if it involves such an act in regard to Christ; but that if there is such an act in the Eucharist there is an insuperable difficulty as to the finality of the Sacrifice on the Cross. So far as his argument goes Canon Guy could meet the difficulty by saying that he only claims that the Eucharist is a sacrifice in a subordinate and secondary sense. On the other hand, his book as a whole leaves me, rightly or wrongly, with the strong impression that so far as his instinct is concerned he would wish to assert more.

I believe it is possible to assert far more, even if we accept the position as I have stated it above, as I have stated it not only in deference to Canon Guy's difficulty, but because I share his difficulty. There is one way out, and so far as I can see only one way out, which would make it possible to describe the Eucharist as a sacrifice in a primary sense. In the first place, the act of destruction, in virtue of which the Eucharist is a sacrifice, must be the death upon the Cross, not some further act of destruction or other corresponding change. In itself this involves no more than the assertion that the Eucharist is not a sacrifice apart from the Cross, a view which would be widely admitted by Catholic theologians. On the other hand,

if this is so, and if we are at the same time to say that from one point of view the Cross is the one sacrifice, but from another that every Eucharist is a sacrifice, we have to seek some other aspect of sacrifice which is no less essential than an act of destruction and which is present in the Eucharist. While such a position might lead us to say that as the Eucharist is a sacrifice in virtue of the Cross, so the Cross is a sacrifice in virtue of the Eucharist, without this statement being necessarily open to grave objection; yet this can only be the case if we can also say both that from one angle the Cross is the only sacrifice, even if from another every Mass is a sacrifice, and that the Cross is fundamental in a sense in which the Mass is not. We have further to account, and to account fairly and adequately, for the absence in the Pauline Epistles and in the Epistle to the Hebrews of any express recognition of such a view as has been indicated.

The first question, in regard to any such view, is clearly whether there is an element in sacrifice, dependent upon the act of destruction, but no less characteristic? I can best attempt to deal with this issue by indicating, in the first place, certain other questions which led me in the first instance to accept the view that there is such an element. Suppose that Abraham had slain Isaac in his sleep instead of preparing to slay him on an altar or in accordance with some other convention which clearly expressed his purpose of sacrifice. Would one regard that as a fulfilment of a command to sacrifice his son? Think of any other sacrifice, actual or legendary, and imagine all ritual acts omitted, leaving simply an act of destruction not performed in a ritual manner. Whatever the purpose of the act, would it fully correspond to what we mean by a sacrifice, save as we have come to apply the term in a metaphorical sense? In short, is not some ritual act which expressly invests the act of destruction with its sacred purpose or significance at least as characteristic an element in sacrifice as is the act of destruction itself?

If, as appears to be the case, this question must be answered in the affirmative, the explanation is not far to seek. Consider first honorific sacrifices. It is not possible to regard these *simply* as gifts to the god in question; the gift is so made as to constitute an act of homage, a formal recognition and acknowledgment of his sovereign claims. There lies the explanation, for example, of the fact that the inherent value of that which is surrendered is, on the whole, less important than that it should have been expressly appointed or that it should possess a natural symbolism; and there also lies the explanation of the need for such act or acts as will expressly

invest the rite with its significance. In consequence, if a formal definition of a sacrifice is to be attempted it would appear necessary so to frame it as to treat this aspect as an essential element, by asserting, for example, that a sacrifice is a series of related actions dictated by belief in some Higher Power and involving (*a*) the giving or giving up of something, in and through an act of destruction, to a supernatural Being—or to secure a supernatural end or to secure supernatural aid; and (*b*) an act or acts dependent on or closely related to the act of destruction, and of such a character as formally to invest this with its supernatural significance, and thus to render the rite an express acknowledgment of a relation to some Higher Power.

The need for some such definition appears to be no less real in the case of propitiatory sacrifices than in the case of honorific sacrifices. We would hesitate to describe as a propitiatory sacrifice an act of destruction, even if this was conceived as effecting a propitiation, unless the act of destruction was performed in such a manner or accompanied by such further acts as served to express its purpose and significance. If a god was believed to have required the death, say, of the King's son in consequence of tribal sin, and if the King's son was promptly slain *without ceremony*, we would say that the purpose of his death was the propitiation of the god, but we would not describe what took place as a propitiatory sacrifice. We would so describe it if the manner of his death, or other closely related ritual acts, gave expression to the purpose and significance of the death; and an explanation of the apparent necessity for such ritual acts may again be found in the fact that they render the rite an express acknowledgment of a relation to God, in this case a relation which has gone wrong. It is precisely in virtue of the presence and significance of such acts that there is not only a purpose of propitiation, but an avowal of that purpose. The rite thus becomes an express acknowledgment of the need for propitiation and, in so far as this propitiation is held to be necessitated by sin, an acknowledgment of the nature of sin and its significance. Nor is acknowledgment before God the whole story. Propitiatory sacrifices are conceived not only as an acknowledgment by man before God, but, in so far as they are thought of as divinely appointed, as an authoritative declaration to man of the significance and effect of sin. In short, such sacrifices have a manward as well as a Godward reference, and the declaration to man as well as the acknowledgment before God implies ritual acts which expressly assign its significance to the act of destruction.

It is, I believe, impossible, as one attempts to analyze

sacrifice, to avoid the admission that any rite, which we would describe with certainty as a sacrifice, involves not only an act of destruction, but also, of necessity and not merely by accident, acts which, either by their special character or in accordance with a recognized convention, clearly invest such destruction with its supernatural significance, and thus render the rite an express acknowledgment of man's relation to God. Nor is it possible to belittle the importance of these latter acts. Few would be prepared to deny that the practice of sacrifice has played a real part in spiritual experience. Yet this can hardly be ascribed to the slaughter of victims which turned temples into shambles and their priests into butchers. Nor can it be ascribed satisfactorily to the cost of the surrender involved. This last is obviously a factor, but having regard to many examples it can hardly be the only or the chief factor. In the case of honorific sacrifices an explanation must surely be sought in the fact that utter surrender, as expressed in slaughter or destruction, afforded a suitable vehicle, and was expressly made the vehicle, of an acknowledgment of God's claim on man. In the case of propitiatory sacrifices their moral value, and any benefit which in fact resulted, must surely be held to have depended, not on the act of destruction in itself, but on the express investment of this with a propitiatory significance so that the rite constituted an acknowledgment before God and a declaration to man of the nature and effect of sin.

If, then, we are justified in regarding as an essential and important element in sacrifice, no less essential or important than immolation, acts which expressly invest the immolation with its significance, the first condition is secured for a solution of our problem. It may be noted at once that as shown, for example, by the case of the Passover, it is such acts, rather than the killing of the victim, which are necessarily performed by the priest. On this ground, and for the sake of brevity, I propose in what follows to refer to such acts as " sacerdotal acts."

It will by now be obvious that the view to which I am approaching is that the Last Supper and the Eucharist are not separate sacrifices from that of Calvary, but supply a necessary element in the Sacrifice of Calvary, by expressly investing our Lord's death before God and man with its sacrificial significance. Two questions immediately arise. Can the sacerdotal acts be thus separated from the immolation, and can they be multiplied in time and space ? Secondly, and of more importance, how far is the necessity of such acts

affected if we ascribe absolute and not merely symbolic value to the death of our Lord ?

The first of these questions can best be dealt with by a simple analogy. Imagine a rite which consisted in the slaughter of a victim, for the purpose of the rite, but without ceremonial act, and the distribution of its flesh to a variety of temples in each of which the flesh was consumed in a ritual meal. We would say that such a rite was a sacrificial meal, but we would hesitate to describe it as a sacrifice. But now suppose that in each temple, before the meal, the flesh was so blessed as expressly to ascribe a supernatural significance to the killing of the victim. In this case the whole rite would, I think, be described without hesitation as a sacrifice. Further, anyone present in one of the temples would not hesitate to say that the rite at which he was present was a sacrifice; and, on the other hand, it would be true to say that there was only one sacrifice.

Before applying such an analogy to Calvary and to the Eucharist, we have to face the far harder question of the radical difference which is involved if we ascribe absolute value to the death of our Lord. We have to face, not indeed the whole problem of the Atonement, but so much of that problem as is required to relate the Atonement to those sacrificial conceptions with which we are immediately concerned. It is not infrequently suggested that any conception of a satisfaction for sin is out of place in a Christian conception of Divine forgiveness; and, even if it is sufficiently clear that the conception of a satisfaction effected upon the Cross is an integral part alike of historic Christianity and of New Testament thought, we have to face a real problem as to how this is to be related to our conception of divine mercy. I believe that we can best meet this problem by asserting the necessity that the nature and consequences of sin should find adequate expression. I have not in mind only didactic considerations, although these have their place and might be sufficient. It is neither illegitimate nor unprofitable to think of the history of God's dealings with man as a great drama; and, if we do so and if we apply the canons we would apply to a great drama, we have, I believe, to admit that the drama would be less perfect, and not merely less instructive, if the nature and consequences of sin did not find expression, if the issue was not brought to a head so that the full horror of sin found adequate occasion.

So far as there is anything in the line of thought which I have thus briefly indicated, our problem is much simplified. The fact that sin could, and did, lead men to crucify Him who was their Maker and Very God, constitutes the most terrible

as well as the most poignant exhibition of its nature which we can imagine, far more terrible as well as far more poignant than the miserable destruction of all human beings. Moreover, if we interpret the need for a satisfaction for sin as an assertion of the need that the nature and consequences of sin should find some adequate expression, a number of problems find solution, and in particular the possibility of vicarious satisfaction, and the manner in which this was secured by Calvary. Nor are we involved in any collision with the Parable of the "Prodigal Son." It is surely a superficial reading which finds in the account of the prodigal's sufferings *merely* picturesque but incidental details. It is the absence of any adequate working out of the consequences of sin, as well as the absence of true penitence, which renders contemptible many a would-be "returned prodigal" in fiction or in life.

What is the relation of such a view, which finds in our Lord's death a necessary but all-sufficient expression of the nature of sin, to a need for His expressly assigning to His death, before God and man, a propitiatory significance? In brief, it would appear from what has been said earlier that He thus makes His death to be not only a satisfaction for sin, but a propitiatory sacrifice. Considerations advanced earlier in this review appear to require in the case of such a sacrifice not only acts of destruction which serve to express the nature and consequence of sin, in all other cases in a symbolic and inadequate manner, but such an investment of these with their significance so as to render the rite an acknowledgment before God, and an authoritative declaration to man, of the need of propitiation and therefore of the nature of sin. There would appear to be no reason to regard this further element as superfluous in the case of our Lord's death. It is not only that it is required to render applicable a tentative definition of sacrifice. The point of the definition lay in its being required to express the fact that propitiatory sacrifices have always involved, as a highly important element, acts which embodied and supplied such an acknowledgment and declaration. Nor is there any less necessity for these last in regard to our Lord's death. This supplies in itself an adequate expression of the nature and consequences of sin; but our profiting from the satisfaction thus effected must surely involve our recognition and our acknowledgment of this. Such recognition demands and requires expression no less than any other element in religion; while, if a particular manner of acknowledgment has been appointed, then it is for us to give our recognition this expression rather than to urge, like Naaman, the equal or greater efficacy of possible alternatives.

On the other hand, we cannot regard the Eucharist simply as an acknowledgment by man that our Lord's death exhibits the nature and results of sin, an acknowledgment which is effected by our expressly assigning to that death the significance of an expiatory sacrifice.* At the Eucharist our Lord's death is invested with this significance in and through a rite which, since it affords participation in the blessings of our Lord's sacrifice, must be held to be performed with Divine authority. Because it is in and through such a rite, and therefore with such authority, that the Church's ministers solemnly invest our Lord's death with an expiatory significance, and thus acknowledge before God and declare to man the nature of sin, they may properly be termed priests. On the other hand, such a statement of the position is something less than the truth. This Divine authority is possessed, as we believe, because the Eucharist is celebrated by our Lord's command, whether given at the Last Supper or, through the Holy Spirit, to the early Church. In accordance with our conception of Christians not as external to our Lord, but as members of His body, Christian acts performed by His command must be thought of less as performed by His authority, than as performed by Him through the members of His mystical body. As a result, He is to be conceived as Himself the Priest in the Eucharist, no less than at the Last Supper; but because His ministers are also our representatives we participate in His sacerdotal act.

On such a view the Eucharist is a sacrifice, not only or primarily because we offer thanksgiving or give money or hallow bread and wine, or even because Christ is there given to be our food, but because by word and act, by the words of institution and in the double consecration, His death is proclaimed, before God and man, as an expiatory sacrifice, and because this express investing of a sacrificial death with its significance is no mere declaration, adding nothing beyond declaration, but is itself an essential element in such a sacrifice, required not by some trick of definition, but in order to supply

* I use the phrase "expiatory sacrifice" as best describing a sacrifice which is regarded as propitiatory alike in intention and effect, and as necessitated by sin. That this significance is assigned to our Lord's death by the Eucharist, and that the early Church regarded the institution as assigning to it this significance, is made clear by the words of institution, as given in the various records and as taken up into the Eucharistic Liturgies. Our Lord's Body is described as given for us, His Blood as poured out for us, as inaugurating a new covenant, and as poured out unto the remission of sins. Even apart from the presence of the last of these phrases we would be justified in reading its meaning into any description of our Lord's sacrifice which represents this as propitiatory, since the propitiation thus effected was, from the first and as a matter of course, held to be necessitated through sin.

an overt acknowledgment and declaration of the nature and consequences of sin. Whether we think of the Cross as the one sacrifice or of each Eucharist as a sacrifice, whether we speak of Christ as having been once offered upon the Cross or as being offered in every Mass, depends simply on whether we are thinking in terms of one or other of two essential aspects of sacrifice. If we think of sacrifice in terms of the act of destruction, Christ was once offered upon the Cross. If we think of sacrifice in terms of the sacerdotal acts which expressly invest an act of destruction with its significance, then Christ is offered in every Mass. Either view is correct from its own angle: and for either view the Death is fundamental. Nor does a choice appear possible or desirable between one or other mode of expression. Both must be used in their proper context if we are not to minimize unduly either the Cross or the Eucharist.

Before I pass to the last part in the problem, the relation of such a view to New Testament thought, there is one subordinate point in regard to sacrifice which appears to be of sufficient value and relevance to deserve emphasis. Details in the symbolism of the sacerdotal acts are often highly significant, and of real devotional value. It is in this connection that it appears possible to retain and use the truth embodied in conceptions of the Eucharistic Sacrifice which emphasize the offering of bread and wine. The fundamental fact in the consecration is that Christ is given to be appropriated as our Sacrifice, and that His death is thus expressly invested with a sacrificial significance. But, in subordination to this, we may well dwell on the symbolism of the means by which it is secured; on the consecration of typical gifts of God; on how much is thereby made of gifts so common or so capable of abuse; and, by that identification of the worshipper with the thing consecrated which is so frequent an idea in sacrifice, on the purpose of hallowing ourselves, not to become as many separate and inadequate sacrifices as there are individuals, but to become one with and in Him who is the only perfect sacrifice. If I seem to have omitted another conception of the Eucharistic Sacrifice which is too deep-rooted to be thus ignored, I would reply that the solemn assertion, before God as well as before man, of the expiatory character of our Lord's death, is in itself in the strongest possible manner a pleading of that death. Further pleading of that death in the Eucharistic Liturgies is valuable as bringing out what is thus involved. It can add nothing to what is involved.

There remains the problem which is presented by the fact that the line of thought which is the backbone of the above

argument finds little, if any, expression or direct countenance in the New Testament and in particular in the treatment of our Lord's sacrifice in the Epistle to the Hebrews. If I treat the resulting difficulty somewhat briefly it is not because of its unimportance. As I have said, it is a problem which must be met both fairly and adequately. On the other hand, it is a problem which in the main turns on a single issue, and on an issue which can be briefly stated. Such a line of thought as that which I have developed is not involved in any direct collision with the Epistle to the Hebrews or other passages in the New Testament, which treat of our Lord's sacrifice. It in no way excludes, for example, the significance which is given by the writer of that Epistle to our Lord's entry into the Heavens, and it involves less difficulty in regard to the Heavenly Session than does a conception of the Eucharistic Sacrifice which aligns this primarily with a heavenly pleading by our Lord of His Sacrifice. The difficulty which exists arises not from direct contradiction of the New Testament teaching, but from the introduction of ideas which, at any rate on the surface, fall outside that teaching. Such a difficulty is serious precisely in the degree in which we have to conceive New Testament thought as exhaustive. If there is no ground for ascribing to this an *exhaustive* character, much of the difficulty vanishes and we have simply to justify adequately such new ideas as are introduced, and to account adequately for a difference of emphasis and interest. What does need saying at the present moment is that it is hopelessly inconsistent to argue as if New Testament thought was exhaustive when arguing as to Catholic developments of that thought, but to treat it as neither exhaustive nor final when discussing more modern problems, for example, as to St. Paul's attitude to women, or even as to slavery.

Even if New Testament thought should not be regarded as exhaustive, it is none the less necessary to show, as I have tried to show, that those ideas which are introduced to supplement that thought are neither arbitrary nor unnecessary. We have, I think, also to account for and justify the existence of a considerably different emphasis and interest which lead to and require these ideas, and this is especially necessary when we are faced by so full a discussion of our Lord's Sacrifice as is presented by the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is clear that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews thought of our Lord's Sacrifice in terms of His death, and felt no need to emphasize that other aspect of sacrifice with which we have been concerned. That other aspect was, in fact, present if the Eucharist was celebrated. Our Lord's death was thus expressly invested

with its significance, and the nature and effect of sin was thus acknowledged before God and declared to man. On the other hand, it was natural that, as our Lord's Sacrifice came to be apprehended, the death should at first be so emphasized as to obscure the full significance and importance of the Last Supper and the Eucharist. On any view the Death is fundamental. If, as I am informed, Jewish sacrificial terms tend to emphasize the actual killing of the victim, this may have assisted to turn thought in the same direction; but such a direction was in any case so inevitable as to supply ample explanation if the significance and importance of other elements in our Lord's sacrifice were not at first fully appreciated. There is, however, a further consideration which has even greater weight. We have to reckon in this connection, as in so many other problems, with the nature and effect of the expectation of an early Parousia. As that belief changed, it was inevitable that Christian thinkers should come to feel a far greater intellectual interest in the worship in which they participated here on earth and that they should seek to discover, and having found should emphasize, the full significance of that worship. Here, as elsewhere, we have to recognize the legitimacy, and indeed the necessity, of different interests and different emphasis in later thought and in face of the earlier belief. Nor are there many points where this is more relevant.

What is the upshot? If such a view as has been sketched is correct, how much does that matter? What devotional difference does it make in our attitude to the Eucharist? I venture to think, a great deal. The Eucharist is too exclusively regarded by many Anglicans as a means of communion. Where that idea is supplemented, it is by emphasis on the opportunity for worship of our Lord and on the pleading of His Sacrifice. But in practice it is by no means uncommon for far greater emphasis to fall on the former of these two conceptions; and the pleading of our Lord's Sacrifice is apt to be associated primarily with hymns or prayers in which we plead in so many words that sacrifice. As has been said, these have great value as expressing what is otherwise involved. If the conception adopted in this review is in any degree correct, what is fundamental is the express investment of our Lord's death with its significance, the solemn and reiterated declaration, in word and act, that Christ's death is an expiatory sacrifice. By the solemn assertion before God as well as before man that His death possesses such a significance we are in fact pleading that death, as has been said, in the strongest possible manner, but we are also participating in an acknowledgment before God and a declaration to man of the meaning and

nature of sin. As the pleading of our Lord's death comes thus to be conceived, and as we recognize, as an essential element, the fact that a necessary acknowledgment of the nature of sin is thus effected, the devotional gain is, as I believe, very real. That gain is the more real in proportion as we realize that all this is most truly conceived as done, through us, by our Lord.

WILL SPENS.

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE WORKS OF DR. DUBOSE.

IT used to be said that on one occasion when Dr. Temple was Bishop of London, a penitent who had made her confession to him, before leaving asked what she should do if she failed again. The Bishop answered (and the answer was characteristic enough to be true), "You mustn't." Those of us who knew Dr. Temple would feel sure that, for anyone who possessed his iron will, the answer was a very good one. But for the average man and woman—for such persons as we know ourselves to be—such a reply might easily lead to despair. Nor, with all possible deference to the Bishop, can it be denied that he was wrong. A confession, even though made with the deepest penitence, and therefore with the firmest purpose of amendment, depends for its efficacy not on the fact that there will never be another failure of the same kind, but on the determination of the penitent that, to the utmost of his power, there shall be none.

This is a point which, in recent years, has been made clearer to us by the teaching of Dr. DuBose, sometime Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee, and a very outstanding figure in recent American theology. In 1894, after thirty-six years of continuous service in the above-named University, he was elected Dean and Professor Emeritus, and during the time that he occupied this post (he died in August, 1918) he produced several theological works which have been much read and valued on this side of the Atlantic. Of these, the following are probably the best known: *The Soteriology of the New Testament*, *The Gospel in the Gospels*, *The Gospel according to St. Paul*, *High Priesthood and Sacrifice*. Nor must his last book be forgotten, *Notes of My Teaching*.

These books, and others like them, have taught some of us much that we greatly value on the subject of Faith, and the writer of this note wishes, in view of the immense importance

of thinking rightly on the subject, to show, mainly by quotations from the Professor's books (quotations which might be almost indefinitely multiplied), how illuminating his teaching is, and marked by a freshness and a power of stating familiar truths in an arresting way, which one connects rather naturally with the United States of America.*

Most of us who read or teach Theology would probably be prepared to admit that the subject of "Justification by Faith" is one which, at any rate in our early days, we found singularly dry and unpalatable. We disliked the word "forensic," and were not always quite sure that we understood it. The doctrine of imputation was singularly unsatisfying, and Dr. Mozley's essay on Luther made it impossible for us ever to accept imputed righteousness as a possible explanation. "Formally and literally stated, the Lutheran doctrine of Justification by Faith is so inconsistent with the first principles of common sense and natural religion that, in this shape, no human being can possibly believe it. It requires us to believe that that which makes a man pleasing to God, or justifies him, has nothing to do with morality or goodness in him; and, being moral creatures, we cannot believe this."†

True, we learnt—and it is to be hoped have never forgotten—what Dr. Newman taught in *Faith and Justification*. He lifted the whole subject out of the legal and technical atmosphere, and shed a new light on our sacramental, mystical union with our Lord. Once convinced that we were "accepted in the beloved" (Eph. i. 6, A.V.), and living in vital union with Him, all was changed for us. But still we were not very clear about justification.

The subject is a large one, and, though it is obviously impossible to deal with such points as these in any detail, it may be worth while to draw attention to Professor DuBose's special contribution to it.

Before doing so, however, it may be permissible to quote a few lines from an article on the word "Faith" in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*:‡ "In the Old Testament the man of Faith is one whose state of mind is free from faint-heartedness (Is. vii. 9) and anxious haste (Is. xxviii. 16), and who stays himself upon the object of his contemplation with confidence and trust. The implication seems to be not so much that of a passive dependence as of a vigorous active commitment. He who, in the Hebrew sense, exercises faith, is secure, assured,

* Those who know Dr. DuBose's books will be able to recall passages dealing with the possibility of our Lord's sinning which seem to clash with Catholic teaching; but the subject dealt with in this note seems to be unaffected by this.

† *Essays, Historical and Theological*, J. B. Mozley, vol. ii., p. 434.

‡ Vol. ii., p. 823.

confident (Ps. xxvii. 13), and lays hold of the object of his confidence with firm trust." Again, commenting on Gen. xv. 6: "The object of Abraham's faith, as here set forth, was not the promise which appears as the occasion of its exercise: what it rested on was God Himself, and that not mainly as the Giver of the promise here recorded, but as His servant's 'shield and exceeding great reward.' It was through the adoption from the Septuagint of this underlying force of πιστεύειν, that the word was fitted to take its place in the New Testament as the standing designation of the attitude of the man of faith towards God." The writer of the article goes on to show how that connotation of the word "Faith" has been taken up into the New Testament and how when we come to the use of its various prepositions (ἐν, ἐπί, above all εἰς), the deeper sense of the word—that of firm, trustful reliance—comes to its full rights. He gives abundant quotations, and sums up his remarks thus: "In any event, what these passages express is an absolute transference of trust from ourselves to another, a complete self-surrender." Further, the writer goes on to show that nowhere in the multitude of the places where the active sense of πίστις occurs is it applied to man's faith in man, but always to the religion that reposes on God, or Christ, or Divine things: "All that we usually associate with the word 'faith,' its intellectual implications, etc., are there, but here we see how essentially practical it is—so much more than a mere conviction of the understanding—rather a movement of the whole inner man."

So here we get away from all that is merely technical in the idea of justification. The man justified by faith is he who has been sacramentally united to Christ, and who remains in a state of grace (Rom. v. 1, 2); Christ is "in him," and he is "in Christ." And all this, being wrought into the very texture of his life, gives—even though he may at times fail—a joyous hopeful spirit of trust. We are reminded of St. John's words: "God is greater than our heart and knoweth all things. If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God" (1 St. John iii. 20, 21). This is no light-hearted carelessness about sin: it is the attitude of the man who, however discouraged he may sometimes be at his own frailties, yet never lets the general trend of his life be altered, nor mistrusts the pardoning love of God. He himself sees all the failures, but he is sure that God sees "the genuine utter love which is our motive."*

It is just this attitude of the Christian to sin that DuBose has caught hold of and expressed again and again in his books

* Gore, *Epistles of St. John* (*in loco*).

—a message of such hope, courage, and joy that it must bring peace to men of goodwill.

It is impossible to make clear by quotations how full Dr. DuBose's books are of this subject, so constantly does it recur, as the "motive" of a fugue does; but some attempt must be made at least to indicate his line of thought.

Many minor points can only be alluded to, as, for instance, his insistence on the reality of Grace. To him Christ is not merely the Ideal of the Christian life, but its one Fount and Source; not only the Goal, but the Way. He insists on the fact that grace is the work of the Holy Spirit in us: "The essence of divine grace is divine Self-communication: God gives us nothing less than Himself."* "Jesus Christ is to me, not a name, nor a memory or tradition, nor an idea or sentiment, nor a personification, but a living and personal reality, presence, and power."† Sin, he teaches, must go; that is essential, and that cannot be without man's co-operation: "There can be no real or divine pardon or forgiveness or remission of sin, or making a sinner not a sinner, without the full co-operation of the sinner himself in the act; . . . the action of divine grace is never severed from the condition of human repentance and faith."‡

And, further, our existing "circumstances" are essential for the carrying out of God's purpose. To escape from our circumstances for the sake of an easier life is impossible: there is no other way than the Cross.§ "Our conditions in this world, as Bishop Butler says, 'are what they are.' It is no part of the manifest divine intention, in the whole or in any of the particulars, to alter the conditions for us, but only to do so through and with and by us—so fast and so far as we will act in and with Him."|| The conditions and circumstances of earth are precisely those that are fitted and suited to develop in us the actions and characters that make up our lives.

It is a strong and inspiring gospel—not indeed new, but strikingly and forcibly presented.

It is, however, in his dealing with the question of "Justification by Faith" that we get at his central thought. We may turn once more to Bishop Temple's advice, "You mustn't." Obviously, in nine cases out of ten, such advice will be no advice at all. In numberless cases something is wanted which will in no way lower the standard of the Christian life, which will ask all that must be asked, unless the man is to degenerate and revert to type. What is this something? DuBose tells

* *The Reason of Life*, p. 147. † *Ibid.*, p. 163. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 171.
§ *High Priesthood and Sacrifice*, pp. 41, 110, 111.
|| *The Reason of Life*, p. 191.

us. We are saved by hope. The ideal is apparently unattainable, altogether out of our reach. It is practically the same as St. John's teaching: "He that abideth in Him sinneth not." Old and New Testament alike (DuBose has much to say that is valuable about the Old Testament, especially in *High Priesthood and Sacrifice*) hold up this standard; but how impossible it looks! It brings us right up against that which, for a busy parish priest in dealing with his penitents, is almost a daily problem. Here are these people, striving to live with so high a standard, and we honour them for it, we would encourage them to the best of our power to persevere in it. But how difficult to keep them at times from despair, and this largely because they are forgetting the essential element of patience, the patience that our Lord so often lays stress upon in His parables of the Kingdom.

Our chief aim must be to teach them how much in itself this Godward trend of life means, how much it stands for—to remind them that God sees not only the failure, but the desire, and that the desire, even while it seems so little, is infinitely precious in His sight. They must go on desiring perfection, resolving again and again to win it, leaning less on self and more on God—flinging on Him the burden of their difficulties. He (and this is DuBose's special contribution) sees the end in the beginning. He knows how elementary perhaps and weak their faith is, but He also knows that it is real. The peace, it is true, is slow in coming, for there can be no perfect peace till the sin which mars it is wholly cast out.

A few brief quotations must sum up this point:

> The moment a human life has really made Jesus Christ its end, although that end be as yet only the end of purpose, and infinitely not yet the end of attainment, that moment God imputes to that life what it means and intends as though it had already accomplished it—Faith is, as St. Paul teaches, imputed to us for righteousness; it is reckoned or accounted as being righteousness. . . . It is a principle on which we ourselves act in our imperfect measure. Let us perfectly know that one fully means a certain act or a certain part towards us, and that fact establishes a status between us as complete as though he had already fulfilled it.*

He makes it abundantly clear that the putting away of sin and the putting on of holiness is absolutely real—a process of gradual transformation—a process of which the Divine holiness is only the limit:

> If Jesus Christ teaches anything and stands for anything, it is a real and complete repentance, based upon a real and complete faith, a thoroughgoing and effectual attitude towards sin and towards holiness,

* *The Gospel in the Gospels*, p. 153.

an attitude which shall be so whole an activity of the whole man that it will make a complete new man of him.*

Yet still the essential point is the attitude:

We cannot indeed bring to Him at once a sin completely put away and a oneness with Him restored, but we can bring to Him an attitude toward our sin which means and can never be satisfied with less than its complete putting away; and we can bring an attitude toward holiness which means and can never stop short of the most perfect actual attainment of the most perfect holiness. If we do in reality and sincerity bring this, then God can treat what we really mean and intend as though it really were, and by treating them so or calling them so make them so.†

A most characteristic passage occurs in *High Priesthood and Sacrifice*, of which a few words may be quoted:

God sent His Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin and περὶ ἁμαρτίας, for or about sin. That is the one question or issue in human life and destiny: What about sin? What is to be done about it, by God and ourselves? For it lies between us and Him. . . . It is not the imputation merely, or the condemnation, or the penalty or consequences of sin from which we are thinking or talking of being saved. It is the sin itself. . . . The only conditions of a real peace are the removal of all the causes which render peace impossible because they constitute enmity. It would seem to follow from the above reasoning that the only way to be reconciled and at peace with God is to be purified and free from sin. Absolutely and ultimately that is so. But what is true in the end is reversed in the process. And that reversal is just the essential distinction between the method of law and works on one side and that of gospel and grace on the other. The method of law is that we are reconciled by being purified or pure, the method of grace is that we are purified through being first reconciled.‡

Then after a statement of the process of grace—a process of awakening, struggle, and dependence—and after dwelling on the reality of the reconciliation through Christ, he passes on to describe the status of the sinner with God:

He is not holy in fact, but he is holy in faith; and his holiness in faith is God's effectual way of making him holy in fact. He is one with God, or at one with God, because all that as yet he infinitely is not, he wholly believes and loves and means; and all that he so means he is in principle, and will be in effect. . . . That is the sense in which Jesus Christ takes away our sins even before we have had time to more than begin the putting them away ourselves, and makes us wholly at one with God while yet we are at all our own infinite distance from Him. By having reconciled us in Himself, He now purifies or cleanses us in ourselves; or in the commoner language of theology, having justified us by His own act of grace, He sanctifies us through our own act in Him of faith.§

* *The Gospel in the Gospels*, p. 151.
† *Ibid.*, p. 178.
‡ *High Priesthood and Sacrifice*, pp. 35, 36.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

It would not be difficult to show that in such teaching as this there are certain points which need to be guarded against, just as one feels the dangers of Browning's gospel: "All I aspired to be, and was not, comforts me." But it is easy to find in Walter Hilton, the old English fourteenth-century mystic, words which are closely parallel to DuBose (*e.g.*, book ii., chap. vii.).*

It is interesting to note that Canon Quick in his recent book, *Liberalism, Modernism, and Traditionalism*, sums it all up thus:

> St. Paul's whole argument about justification by faith reproduces, with a faithfulness more remarkable for the utter diversity of language, cardinal and characteristic principles of our Lord's whole doctrine. By faith St. Paul meant in effect the Christward orientation of the personality, the ὄρεξις of the whole man after Christ, which makes the believer capable of the receiving and experiencing the transforming power of God's love through Christ. This attitude of soul was what justified the man because it made him capable of the highest life; whereas the search for justification by works—*i.e.*, the exact performance of a code—either left a man in despair or created a far more dangerous illusion of salvation attained, when the highest was really out of sight. The argument was specially directed against the self-satisfied feeling of orthodox superiority which made the strict Jew incapable of placing himself for one moment on a level with the Gentile sinner. The essence of our Lord's teaching about publicans and harlots going into the Kingdom before Pharisees is exactly the same. The publican who knew his utter need was justified rather than he who performed all his duties and thanked God that he was not as other men. The common and characteristic principle in the two teachings is that spiritual health is to be measured by the capacity to grow rather than by what is already possessed. From this point of view self-satisfaction is the only strictly mortal sin, because it destroys the power to grow and to receive. St. Paul's whole doctrine of justification by faith is a theological commentary on our Lord's paradox: "To him that hath shall be given."†

Everything turns on receptiveness. "Blessed are the beggars in spirit."

W. B. Trevelyan.

THE ATONEMENT

I.—THE CONTENT OF SALVATION

There have been many definitions of what Christians mean by salvation; but none is simpler, nor yet more profound, than that implied in the contrast which the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews draws between "dead works" and the service of the living God. He is arguing *a fortiori* from the ritual efficacy, within their own sphere, of the Jewish purifications

* *The Scale of Perfection*, by Walter Hilton (London: Art and Book Company).
† *Liberalism, Modernism, and Traditionalism*, pp. 85, 86.

to the real efficacy of the cleansing wrought by Christ, and says: "For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through eternal spirit offered Himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" (Heb. ix. 13, 14). The phrase "dead works" is peculiar to this author in the New Testament,* and seems to be struck from the anvil of experience. They are characteristic of a type or order of human life which Christians have known and left behind, when they learnt to serve the living God. They include what St. Paul called "the works of the Law," but they are more than they; for their reference is to no particular historical moral code, but to all acts, whether of thought or deed, which proceed from a certain kind of character and motive.

This motive may be defined both negatively and positively. Negatively it is a motive which ignores God. "Dead works" are works done apart from, and without reference to, Him. This reference need not be direct nor conscious in the case of every act. The schoolmen used to distinguish three degrees of reference, according to which an act might be referred to God *virtualiter*, *habitualiter*, or *actualiter*†—a distinction which Jeremy Taylor refines still further;‡ the upshot being that any act may be regarded as referred to God which is part of a general purpose or process so referred. But "dead works" are outside any such purpose or process. The motive behind them runs up at no time to transcendent issues, and has no light or shadow playing upon it from the whole of things. They are thus essentially the works proper to what St. John calls "the world"—society, that is, as organized apart from God. They have the mechanical and conventional quality about them which distinguishes worldliness. They are done without vision, and for that reason are "dead"; for "where there is no vision, the people perisheth" (Prov. xxix. 18).

The positive basis of the type of character or spiritual condition from which these works proceed may be defined as selfishness. Self is the residuary legatee of all neglect of, and indifference to, God: if He is not to be the centre of life and purpose, the Ego will be. "Dead works" are such as lead nowhere except back to oneself, and are done throughout within the Self's orbit. So far as the "world" can be said to

* Yet *cf.* Ecclus. xviii. 29, quoted by Dr. Nairne, *in loc.*

† *E.g.*, Scotus, in 2 *Sent. Dist*, 41. The first two modes of reference are treated by Jeremy Taylor as one.

‡ *Ductor Dubitantium*, IV., ii. 6: "The third is a glorifying of God *interpretative*, by equivalence and interpretation; and this fourth does it *consecutive*, by way of consequence and acceptation."

have an underlying spiritual unity, it is in that tacit compromise which experience has shown to be necessary if selfishness is not immediately to stultify itself. George Meredith has depicted this motive in classical colours in *The Egoist*. It was this self-enclosed quality which made Bunyan's conscience recoil from many of the harmless pursuits in which his village companions indulged. He was mistaken, no doubt, as a result of his Puritan upbringing, in supposing that such acts could not be redeemed by being done to God's glory; but, as the issue presented itself to him, he could not regard them as other than sin; for they were inextricably associated in his mind with that reference of life to Self against which his soul was beginning to revolt.

"Dead works" therefore include all sinful works—both those which are formally wrong as being done in disobedience to ethical law, and also those which are wrong because they proceed from a will which is unrelated to its true end in God. This is not to make sin something more than a transgression of the Decalogue: it is to give the Ten Commandments their full and proper weight and significance as applying to the motive and the heart no less than to the deed, and to insist that the "First Table" is of even greater import—as Christ taught—than the Second. "Dead works" are all works done in oblivion of what Christ called "the first and great commandment." They are proper to life on the purely natural level: they are characteristic of what we call secularism. And they are compatible with a strict keeping of the last six commandments of the Decalogue, as understood in the old Dispensation. What Jesus did was to recover and enhance the original radiance and power of the First Table of the Decalogue, and to reinterpret in the light of it the Second. And He was uncompromising in His insistence upon the transvaluation so effected. When one was drawn to Him whom He could not help loving, He had to refuse His service, because he could not face the cost involved in conversion to the living God (Mark x. 22).

The contrasted condition, which the writer to the Hebrews sets forth as the specific gift of Christianity, is that of a devoted and (in the literal sense) *worship-ful* life.* In this life the dominant motive determining character is the desire to give God His due; and that is the meaning of worship. The Self is subordinated here to the pursuit of an end in a realm of ends transcending the natural order. This realm and the whole community of those whose souls are dominated by it is what

* *Cf.* Souter, *Pocket Lexicon*, sub voc. "λατρεύω, *I serve*, especially God, perhaps simply *I worship*." See also Grimm-Thayer, *in loc.*

our Lord called the Kingdom of Heaven or of God; and the motive and spirit of worship, conceived in its widest sense as embracing the whole sphere of everyday thought and action, is what the New Testament writers and Jesus Himself meant by "righteousness." So our Lord bade His disciples "seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness"; and St. Paul says, "The kingdom of God is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." The conception is of a moral life deriving from, and determined by, fellowship with God. Christians are thus to be in the world, but not of it; in the world because they are to live the fullest and richest possible life; not of it, because at every moment they are servants of an Invisible King, and it is to Him that in one degree or another all their works stand referred. If Christ promised the immediate advent of a time when men should adore (προσκυνεῖν) the Father in spirit and truth (John iv. 23), it was because He came to create the conditions in which all life should become a service (λατρεία) to the living God. It is in the existence and use of those conditions that we shall find the fundamental ground of distinction between Christianity and secularism.

It is important to grasp this conception of worship as the foundation of the practical moral life, for it accounts for many facts in the life of the Church which appear paradoxical even to sympathetic observers and inquirers. Three points in particular may be mentioned. (1) The element of joyousness in the Christian ethic is founded in the conviction that all duty runs up into the privilege and opportunity of an exalted service. The form of the duty may be humble, and its proximate causes such as we should prefer to see changed; or, again, it may be positively painful, morally or physically, in itself: but when it is embraced as something due not to circumstances nor fortune, not only indeed to the society of which we form part, but to the Creator and Lord of all—when, that is to say, what is humdrum as well as what is heroic is transformed into an act of worship—then it acquires from this new setting an irradiation which makes the duty a joy to perform. Aquinas presented an extreme instance of this operation of the Christian motive, when he made provision for the case of sickness being desired as an opportunity of serving God.* Few to-day would regard such a desire as healthy; but at least there are few Christian souls who have not found the recompense of joy that attends the pursuit of the hard and simple life, where good things are renounced for the sake of better and the more difficult alternatives chosen to the greater glory of God. "The statutes of the Lord are right," said the Psalmist, "and rejoice

* *Summa*, II. ii.

the heart." That is why we find *sancta hilaritas* so prominent a feature in the characters of those who have most markedly taken up a cross and followed Jesus.

(2) The idea of the moral life as consisting essentially in the worship of God explains also the steadfast refusal of Christian thought to be content with any purely ethical standards of value. Matthew Arnold's celebrated definition of religion as "morality tinged with emotion" fails just here: it omits the reference of conduct and emotion to final cause which is what makes either properly religious. The primary interest of the Church as the moral educator of mankind is the fostering of the spiritual and worshipful motive. A modern writer* has spoken somewhat satirically of the Church as suspicious of "any currency that does not bear the stamp of its own mint." There is a truth in this; and there is a reason for it. The reason is that the promotion of conduct conformable to Christian standards yet uninspired by the motive which alone exalts that conduct to the level of worship may slip very easily and by insensible stages into the cultivation of the second-best as though it were the best. The result would be that Christian conduct itself might become a kind of "dead works." This is what St. Paul has in mind when he says: "Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing" (1 Cor. xiii. 4). This, too, is what is meant when it is said that religion claims the whole of life. That claim is sometimes interpreted as though it meant that we should spend all our time in Church; and the rejection of the claim often expresses itself in the belief that the obligations of worship are fully satisfied by attendance at church on Sundays. The truth lies far deeper down. Religion does claim the whole of life, not because it claims the whole of our time, but because it claims the whole of our motive; and the task of unifying the hierarchy of motives which determines our character under that single sovereignty of God is the work *par excellence* of Christian perseverance.

(3) At the same time it would be idle to deny that the Church does attach, and always has attached, great importance to what are in the more ordinary sense "acts of worship." These acts are not only the expression of that inner condition of soul which we have been considering; they are also indispensable to its maintenance and development. "Begin by taking holy water," said Pascal, "and you will end by becoming a believer." What he meant was that acts of devotion tend to induce the frame of mind appropriate to them. Educational

* The Dean of St. Paul's, *Outspoken Essays*, Series II.

method and common sense alike agree with Pascal here in the belief that the mind appropriates truth by expressing it. A life without private prayer, a society without public worship, are for that reason alien to the Christian ethical ideal. Human nature is so constituted that, unless we express our duty to God and claim our fellowship with Him, we shall in fact forget it. And in this regard public worship is no less important than private prayer. Those who contend that religion is a matter for the individual and God alone forget that their life is bound up at every point with that of a society which is equally with themselves the object of His solicitude; and the "righteousness" which He requires is due from us, not as units only, but as members of a regenerate mankind. The Catholic canon requiring Christians to attend Mass every Sunday embodies a principle which applies to all who wish to live by the Christian ethic—viz., the necessity of outward and social acts of reconsecration in motive and in conduct to the service of the living God.

This life of worship—of obedience enriched by fellowship with God—is the kingdom of Heaven and eternal life. Salvation is the transference from that self-centred and self-determined life issuing in "dead works" to this God-centred and God-determined life where "freedom is perfect service." To be in a state of salvation is to enjoy that communion with God which exalts us, in and through our obedience, from being servants to being sons, and entitles us to be called "the Children of the Highest." And this salvation, already partially possessed, points forward to a finality—for the individual in the perfect fulfilment of that part and place in the spiritual community for which he was created, for the race in the summation of all mankind under the sovereignty of Christ, its true Representative and Head.

The Christian doctrine of salvation thus involves a great contrast between two kinds or orders of life—the natural and the spiritual or supernatural—and proclaims a change of status from the one to the other. This contrast and change run through the whole of the New Testament. The contrast, indeed, permeates the Old Testament as well, for it is the ultimate significance of that fissure between Israelites and Gentiles which is the clue to the older dispensation. In the New Testament the contrast is broadened and deepened into that between Nature and supernature, between the things of this world and the things of the kingdom of Heaven; and this development is accompanied by the revelation of a way leading men into the spiritual order. The contrast is seen in macrocosm in the distinction St. Paul draws between "the kingdoms

of the world " and " the kingdom of Christ "; in the opposition, so prominent in the writings which bear St. John's name, between the Church and the World, Jerusalem and Babylon; in the sharp antithesis of Light and Darkness, Life and Death, which characterizes the teaching of Jesus Himself. And in the microcosm of the individual life the contrast reveals itself as that between the " natural " (ψυχικόν) and the " spiritual," between the righteousness of the Law and the righteousness of Grace which is by faith. On the lower of these two levels (as St. Paul found) there can be no atonement or reconciliation to God, for it is without that worship which is His due from man. Obedience there may be, but not the obedience of faith which is conditioned by the Divine fellowship: that is of a different order.

The new life of salvation thus presents itself as a quickening and refining of good. Its differentia is to be found not so much in conduct, as in motive and end—in what our Lord called " the heart." Salvation begins when the heart is supernaturally awakened, becomes sensitive to spiritual things, and pays heed to the solicitations of grace. Who are thus awakened, and whether all will eventually be so, we do not know; but at least the fact that some are so and others not seems an undeniable fact of experience. Such a fact would appear to be the permanent element of truth underlying the Calvinistic division of human kind into the lost and the saved. The Calvinistic divines stated this truth with a crudity and baldness which no longer appeal to men's consciences; and a milder and more spiritual exegesis of Scripture has blunted the certainty with which theologians then determined the ultimate fate of their fellow-men. But that there is a fundamental difference not merely between good and evil, but between good and good, in the spiritual condition of men; that the second includes but transcends the first; and that it is the second which is of primary significance for religion, because it is concerned with men's relationship to the eternal Good Himself—these are propositions which appear to have overwhelming testimony in the general mind of the Christian Church. And the question which is of primary moment for men is how the change was and is effected from the secular life to the life of worship—how that Atonement was wrought which issues in the gift of communion with God.

E. G. Selwyn.

(*To be continued later.*)

IS CHRISTIANITY ENOUGH?

THOSE who are attempting to analyze the various social movements in the world to-day will find an unmistakable tendency towards an appeal to Christianity for a solution. It is a vague and restless appeal, as if it came from weariness or from disappointment. It is to be discovered in all sorts of places. Mr. Henry Ford describes his ruling principle as the Golden Rule, and to the application of the Golden Rule he assigns the success of his enterprise. At the other extreme are those who believe that they have found a complete Christian sociology, with definite injunctions as to wages and interest. In the middle ground there are all manner of well-intentioned attempts at the application of the teaching of Jesus Christ to the world's work. Some have convinced themselves that this teaching involves a socialization of the "means of production"; others are convinced that Aristotle was right and that the ownership should be individual and the use should be communal, or that the intention of the use should be communal; others, again, argue that the teaching of Christ clearly indicates an industrial hierarchy, with masters and men, employers and employed, and that the individual conscience must get such light as it can for individual action, and that there is no more to be said; others, finally, argue that "goodness" pays, that the righteous shall flourish, that sin is the stumbling-block to success, and that there is competition, and fierce competition even, in the spiritual world, as indicated by our Lord to the mother of the sons of Zebedee, and that efforts to minimize this feature of our life on earth are in defiance of God's will that here we are in probation for life hereafter. Apparently, therefore, it is true in respect of economic and social life that our Lord came to bring not peace but a sword, and that every attempt at an application of His teaching to our complex life reveals further and further divisions between us.

It is well that we should examine this problem. It means, I think, that unless Christianity has some operative influence in respect of human relationships we shall have to say that for our life Christianity is not enough. There may be the other alternative, and the world may find its problems so hopelessly insoluble that the full and frank adoption of all that Christianity in its fullness implies is the only way in which a vast and universal catastrophe can be prevented. That is, of course, to find that full Christian reunion will come out of the needs of mankind. For the present, however, we may content ourselves with the first issue. Is Christianity enough for the

guidance of man in the complex life of to-day? We do not need to answer the question. It will suffice for present consideration if we look at it from various points of view. We postulate no particular definition of the Divinity of Jesus Christ. All that we ask at the outset is the recognition of the fact that to our Western civilization generally He is Lord and Master. He has no rival in that position. It is Jesus Christ or no one. We may make a list for our admiration, from Plato to Ruskin, teachers and prophets and even martyrs, but Western civilization always distinguishes between them and the Galilæan. In Pater's words: "There is a large class of minds which cannot be sure it is false—minds of very various degrees of conscientiousness and intellectual power, up to the highest. . . . For their part they make allowance in their scheme of life for a great possibility, and with some of them that bare concession of possibility (the subject of it being what it is) becomes the most important fact in the world." More than that, Western civilization, even when hostile to claims which have been made for the Galilæan prophet, has passed its profound tributes to His teaching. Renan and John Stuart Mill are types of this frank acceptance of His guidance in respect of human conduct. So that we have a civilization which claims in some sense of the word to be Christian, which has made the claim in various forms throughout its history, and yet to-day shows signs of seeking guidance, as though from a fresh revelation of truth, from the very Teacher whose name has ever been on its lips. I was at a Conference at Cambridge University a few months ago where a large body of manufacturers and employers sought "A Christian Order in Commerce and Industry." They were earnest. In last century's phrase, they were God-fearing. They were ready for self-sacrifice. They discussed profit-sharing and other methods of "justice" compatible with success in industry. It was a haunting Conference. It left one under the spell of the appalling question, "Is Christianity enough?"

For the human heart revolts against the suggestion that our civilization, being so different from the civilization of Syria of two thousand years ago, demands an interpretation or a toning-down of the Master's teaching. That process conditions what is to be presumed as eternal teaching to transient circumstances. It means that the Master's teaching itself was conditioned, and this it specifically declared itself not to be. It puts us above the Master, for we are picking and choosing what we prefer or what we find suitable. In fine, we are creating Christ in our own image. If we seek a Christian civilization it is surely in vain that we should declare certain

portions of the Christian deposit as inapplicable to our day. Nor can we be contented with a vague Christian sentiment. No one would undervalue the benevolence and goodwill of our time—greater in their operation than ever in the world's history, more sensitive to wrong and more eager to temper the ills of life. Yet that benevolence and goodwill are based upon a presumption which gives one pause, the presumption that by means of benevolence and goodwill we can strengthen our privileges. On the other hand, I can find no authority in Christ's teaching for leaping to the conclusion that a general redistribution of possessions, by whatever authoritative means it may be brought about, is the Christian process. Even the fifty years' release in Deuteronomy finds no echo in His teaching, and this is significant when we realize how frequently He paid tribute to the older law. Clearly the teaching of our Lord called upon certain men for renunciation, though not upon all men. Our civilization seems to me to come to our Lord for guidance and not even to "go away sorrowful" on finding the lesson so difficult. It is as if the rich young man, finding himself beloved, insisted upon being a disciple without fulfilling the primary condition laid down for him.

For that brings us to the central issue. If we put progress, as we understand it, into a phrase, it is the wider distribution of comfort and of convenience. There can be little doubt that the capitalistic era has developed this wider distribution. It may be that the critics are right when they say that under other auspices the distribution might have been wider still; certainly they seem to be on safe ground when they adduce instances of waste and of insufficient and inefficient use of Nature's gifts. But this is precisely where one's doubt enters. Is it the function of the religion of Jesus Christ to put the distribution of comfort and convenience in the foreground? Are not those special capacities of mind and of soul of which we seem to have lost the valuation positively shrouded by the wider distribution of comfort? Then, again, there is the development of security. It would not be denied that civilization has regarded progress in security as its central aim. No one would speak without lowly tenderness of the spectre of dread which hangs over the head not of the wage-earner only, but of the comparatively well-to-do. To fight this spectre all sorts of men and women have scorned delights and lived laborious days. But the thought is haunting that our Lord had little regard for earthly security. In His solemn dismissal of His ambassadors He warned them especially against taking "purse or scrip." We may say that this is in conflict with modern views of mendicancy and with the real

fundamentals of political economy, and that a scheme of endowment for the clergy is a sounder process. I do not contest the truth of this contention, but I venture to suggest that it makes mincemeat of any real meaning of a Christian basis for civilization.

Thus we begin to realize that we can only regard modern civilization as Christian if we treat Christianity in an eclectic fashion by picking this or that in its teaching and by piecing the fragments together into a sort of genial humanitarianism. That may be the essence of goodwill; it may include courtesy and kindliness, but no one can suppose that the life of the Galilæan with its stupendous climax on the bare hill of Calvary meant this and nothing more. Moreover, for two centuries at least it has been in competition with individual self-interest. More than that, it has been a religion of self-interest only tempered by Christianity as it operated upon the individual life. And that is a heavy burden to place on the individual. He must win success by preventing the success of others. Put in that form it is ugly enough, and yet there is no other form in which it can be put. We may lay down an economic law that the success of individual nations depends upon the prosperity of other nations, and that trade and commerce include the same law as regards individuals or individuals associated in companies. But the history of free trade does not indicate that we believe it on the international plane, and the history of trusts and combines does not seem to indicate that we believe it on the plane of the smaller units. The Golden Rule is not very evident in its operations in the financial realm, for it would mean a general tendency not to benefit by special information or by special advantage of any other kind. As a central stimulus, therefore, it cannot be said that Christian principles are being applied, nor can it be said that there is much possibility either of their application or, indeed, of their acceptance. There is admittedly a warm-heartedness which would succour the unfortunate; there is a brotherly-kindliness which would be swift and sure to consider the sick and the needy. It does not manifest itself in readiness to pay taxes or in any other corporate self-surrender. It desires still to be individualistic, to lay to its soul the flattering unction of being kindly. And who would be surprised at it? The truth is that after the operation of self-interest for two centuries, in spite of widespread Christian anxiety from Aquinas to Wycliffe, it is amazing that it should be so tempered with kindliness. It is an indication, in itself, of an aspiration towards some bigger and bolder altruism. It is an evidence of a Christianity of which as yet we have only seen vague indications.

So our answer to the question would seem to be that Christianity, as we have seen it, is not enough. The very demand for the application of Christianity to social problems is also a demand for a positive and vigorous and inclusive spirit of Christianity of which as yet we have only had glimpses. It is to the discovery, the rediscovery, of the comprehensive truth of historic Christianity that we must turn, before we attempt to apply it to the needs of a perplexing age. There is an illuminating passage at the close of Lecky's *History of Rationalism*. He is recounting the triumphs of Rationalism. "The destruction of the belief in witchcraft and of religious persecution, the decay of those ghastly notions concerning future punishments, which for centuries diseased the imaginations and embittered the characters of men, the emancipation of suffering nationalities, the abolition of the belief in the guilt of error, which paralyzed the intellectual, and of the asceticism which paralyzed the material progress of mankind, may be justly regarded as among the greatest triumphs of civilization." But Lecky is too fair a judge to believe that this completes the picture. "When," he says, "we look back to the cheerful alacrity with which, in some former ages, men sacrificed all their material and intellectual interests to what they believed to be right, and when we realize the unclouded assurance that was their reward, it is impossible to deny that we have lost something in our progress." In fact, what we have lost is just that romance and faith which was characteristic of true Christianity. We retained the humanitarianism. We retained the pride in our humanitarianism. We were kindly and tolerant, and, above all, we knew that we were kindly and tolerant. But the "unclouded assurance" was not ours, because we had not dreamed that we had material or intellectual interest to sacrifice. An emasculated and conventional and compromised Christianity is not enough. It has to be supported by all manner of State enactments and other devices. Whether there is yet to be discovered that full and authoritative Christianity which will make far heavier demands upon professing Christians is another matter. At any rate, such a Christianity will be far nearer to the heart of its Founder. Until we find it let us not say that the world can be put right by the operation of a bundle of vague and largely sentimental opinions which we are pleased to call "Christianity" because Christianity gave them birth. Such a bundle of sentiments is certainly incapable of guiding and of governing the volitions and actions of the world. As against all the temptations which present themselves to man such a Christianity is not enough. But that only proves that we have been talking about a Christianity

which we have not known. The very yearning for the application of Christianity to our problems may lead us to examine our Christianity in the light of what its Founder actually did and said. The incompetence of an emasculated Christianity to fulfil its obvious mission may prove to us that we are only on the fringe of the discovery of our Faith. Thus we shall be disposed not so much to discard all that which conventional Christianity has taught us, but to find in it the broken fragments of the completed truth. It is the part which has disguised the whole. When we realize that it is a part only, we have made a sound beginning. We shall soon learn why Christianity is not enough.

JOHN LEE.

PRINCIPLES, NOT PRECEDENTS

WOULD there not be more hope of agreement on the Revision of the Liturgy if we were to seek first to agree on the principles which should underly revision? May I suggest these?

1. Since the Eucharist is based on the commands of our Lord, it is of prime importance to do exactly what He bade us.

2. Since the guidance of the Holy Spirit was promised to the whole Church and not to any section of it, our second duty is to follow the practices which are early and universal rather than late and local.

3. Where the local customs of England do not contradict either of these rules there is no need to alter them.

May I suggest some applications of these principles?

(1) Our Lord bade us do what He had just done, and this command is not fulfilled by reciting what He had done, but by imitating it. He (*a*) gave thanks to the Father over the bread, which constituted blessing or consecrating it; (*b*) broke it; (*c*) distributed it to the communicants with the words, "This is My Body"; (*d*) did the same with the cup. This, then, we have to do. The recitation of the narrative is the reading of the Charter of the service. By almost unanimous consent it may not be omitted, but the real essential is a thanksgiving which has normally begun with, "It is meet and right to give thanks." This phrase is possibly of Jewish origin.* The breaking and communion follow.

(2) In addition to Thanksgiving and the recital of the Charter almost all rites contain a petition that the promise may be fulfilled to the advantage of those present. The position of this petition in most of the great Liturgies is after the end of the Thanksgiving, but this position has better

* See Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 208, No. 17, and the whole note.

grounds than mere precedence. Since the Thanksgiving is the one absolute essential, it must not be interrupted or obscured, and since it starts from the words "It is meet," and includes the Preface and Sanctus, it must be completed by the references to the Passion and Resurrection before the theme is changed to Petition. This rules out the 1549 arrangement, but that has no claims under our second principle. Though antiquity may be claimed for the Roman rite, few students would maintain that its present order is primitive—the Intercessions having been introduced after the Sanctus, it was easy to add also other matter at this point, including a Petition. Even so the Roman rite still includes a Petition for a good communion after the mention of the Resurrection. This precedent we can accept on the principles suggested, and they will also help us in the wording of the Petition. It must not be so worded as to suggest a moment of consecration. Where the rest of Christendom disagrees, the mind of the Spirit is not revealed to us. Only what was agreed before the disagreement arose can claim inspiration. For that we may look to the Verona Fragment: "Send Thy Holy Spirit upon this oblation . . . grant it to all who partake . . . for confirmation of faith." The South African bishops have put this idea into a familiar setting, thus: ". . . Pour Thy Holy Spirit upon us and upon these Thy gifts, that all we who are partakers of this Holy Communion may worthily receive the most precious Body and Blood of Thy Son and be fulfilled with Thy grace and heavenly benediction."

(3) Unnecessary changes are a real hindrance to devotion. Where Scripture is silent and the Church not unanimous we may, as a rule, be content to make no change. This applies to the positions of the Prayer for the Church, of the Confession and Absolution, and of the *Gloria in Excelsis*. On the other hand, the Prayer of Humble Access must be moved to allow the Great Thanksgiving to be continuous, and the Our Father is in all other Liturgies the climax of the whole act of Consecration.

May I in conclusion urge two other changes?

Is not the Incarnation a proper theme to include in the Great Thanksgiving? Can we not shorten the words of administration to "'The Body (or 'Blood') of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve thy body and soul unto everlasting life," confining our late and local additions to a sentence to be said once to all: "Draw near and receive the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, which were given for you, and feed on Him in your hearts by faith with thanksgiving"?

J. S. Bazeley.

MISCELLANEA

CORRESPONDENCE

THE Rev. J. P. Whitney, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Cambridge, writes as follows with reference to our August number:

"SIR,

"As a supporter of the S.P.C.K., and as one who can claim a wide knowledge of English Churchmen, and some acquaintance with recent history, I write to say how deeply I deplore, both as to tone and to fact, your editorial comments on the French in the Ruhr. To speak of 'the cruelties and injustices of the French in the Ruhr' is to make a sweeping charge which seems to me for myself as unfounded as it is, in itself, unchristian. The action of the French has been disapproved of by our statesmen on grounds of expediency and finance, not on those of morality and right, and I think (as I also hope) that the majority of English Churchmen neither share your views nor your prejudice.

"I should also like to protest, with equal force and even a greater claim to speak, on another statement over your initials in another part of the August number (p. 103) that the ablest of our historians do not say 'that the victors in the war were guiltless,' 'even as regards the origin of the war,' or are 'guiltless to-day.' The word 'guiltless' covers much, but no historians that I know of, except in Germany, would agree with the statement as your readers must understand it.

"It would be equally undesirable and impossible to enter into political controversy in the pages of THEOLOGY, although your editorial comments invite it. But, at any rate, a protest is justified, and I should like to make it, to clear my own conscience and those of other English Churchmen for whom I can speak. The effect of the language which you have used, especially where it may seem to claim more than personal authority, may easily be deplorable."

August 2, 1923.

We have also received a letter, too long to print in full, from Dr. Griffith Thomas, of Philadelphia, about an article in the May number entitled "Old Testament Criticism: Some Misgivings." These are some of his contentions:

"I have read with great interest the article by the Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke in your current issue, and especially because it expresses views in the form of 'misgivings' which some of us have held in the form of 'convictions' for a long time. There is no doubt that Mr. Lowther Clarke has put his finger on the weak spot of modern criticism by referring to the fact that it is based upon evolution and may be summed up as the endeavour 'to force the religious ideas enshrined in the literature into the iron mould of an evolutionary hypothesis which is not really applicable to a religious revelation.' This is exactly what Dr. Adam C. Welch is reported to have said in a lecture delivered in Edinburgh in October, 1921. He admitted that the three chief positions associated with the Wellhausen school are incapable of proof; the use of the Divine Names, the late date of Deuteronomy, and the exilic date and character of P.C., adducing as his reasons that they are not related to life but have been

'made into a fixed inelastic system. Humanity does not travel on a road like that.'

"Like Mr. Clarke, I was greatly impressed by the way in which Bishop Gore, in his *Belief in God*, set aside the older tradition and based his argument on the Prophets. It seemed to me that he had not taken account of anything written on the Old Testament from the conservative standpoint within recent years, but was simply stating views that were current when *Lux Mundi* was written. But a good deal of water has flowed under the Bridge since those days, and I am thankful that Mr. Clarke's article indicates that recent conservative scholarship has at last made some impression. The only thing I cannot understand in Mr. Clarke's article is his acceptance of the literary analysis side by side with his criticism of 'the orderly evolution of the idea of God as described in the textbooks.' How can the literary and historical aspects be separated in this way when modern criticism bases its historical and spiritual position on the literary analysis? Wellhausen approaches the Old Testament with naturalistic presuppositions, and on their basis dissects the various books. Is it possible to accept his conclusions and yet to deny his premisses? It is obviously impossible to say that no conclusions on literary questions can affect the foundations of our faith for, as it has been pointed out, the Christian faith is rooted in history and the history is preserved in literature. Are there not certain literary conclusions which would entirely put Christianity beyond the possibility of acceptance? Robertson Smith, in his introduction of Wellhausen's book to English readers, says that 'the critic has no other Bible than the public. He does not profess to have any other documents inaccessible to the laity, nor profess to see anything that the ordinary reader cannot see.' Lightfoot, in discussing the New Testament, pointed out that 'there is at least a presumption (though in individual cases it may prove false on examination) that the historical sense of seventeen or eighteen centuries is larger and truer than the critical insight of a section of men in one late half-century' (*Essays on Supernatural Religion*, p. 23). May not this be paralleled in essential respects in connection with the Old Testament? (Several paragraphs follow, working out this point in detail.)

"Permit me to add that I cannot see that Professor Robinson's view of Mr. Clarke's article is accurate. Professor Robinson's letter makes several definite statements which I believe to be entirely incapable of proof. He thinks that the comparatively high standard of morality in the Mosaic religion 'may have been due to the fact that a nomadic tribe has far fewer temptations than an agricultural and commercial people.' I need scarcely refer to the 'may have' in this extract, though it does not appear to me that the explanation is adequate in any case. Nor is there the slightest hint that the 'comparatively high standard of morality' was due to any Divine influence. Then, Professor Robinson says: 'The Conquest led to Syncretism—Yahweh became Baal.' Here, again, is a statement for which there is no proof in Scripture or in history. And his third statement, that 'nomadic and agricultural religions went on side by side, both as forms of Yahwism,' is equally without historical warrant. It will be seen from all the extracts that Professor Robinson does not give the slightest hint of any Divine movement at the back of Israel's religion. To quote Mr. Clarke, 'It is all very clear and logical, and satisfies the natural desire of the mind for simple and orderly arrangement; but does history really work in this way?'"

EARLY IDEAS OF THE EUCHARIST

Altchristliche Liturgien: Das Christliche Mysterium. Studie zur Geschichte des Abendmahles. Von G. P. Wetter. Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Rupprecht. 1921.

The Rev. F. C. Spurr, writing about the Anglo-Catholic Congress in *The British Weekly* of July 19, 1923, pointed out that Sacramentalism formed an insuperable barrier between Anglo-Catholics and Free Churchmen. "Between the faith and practice of the primitive Church and the *distinctive* faith and practice of 'Catholicism' there is a complete abyss. . . . Historians are able to trace the process by which the change from Christianity to Catholicism took place. The pure stream of Christian practice became polluted with the muddy waters of Mithraism." This impression in the mind of a friendly disposed Nonconformist must be our excuse for reviewing a recent German book at considerable length in a magazine which does not profess to compete with *The Journal of Theological Studies.* The author is now Professor of the New Testament at the University of Upsala. Though a Swede he writes in German. The late Professor Bousset placed a MS. at his disposal in which the same conclusions were reached. The two scholars had often discussed the problems together. The author has also talked them over with M. Loisy, who agrees with his conclusions. When we add that English liturgical scholars have in the main provided the materials for the book, it will be seen that the whole is a noteworthy monument of international scholarship. Professor Wetter belongs to the severest *religionsgeschichtlich* school. Anticipating for a moment his conclusions, we may say that they provide surprises both for Protestants and Anglo-Catholics, except perhaps for the tiny minority of each who are liturgical experts. If Christianity passed through "the muddy waters of Mithraism," it was in the first few years of its existence. On the other hand, though Christianity is declared to have been sacramental from the outset and the Eucharist to have been the centre of Church life, yet the later conceptions of the Eucharist are said to differ radically from the primitive. If this conclusion can be substantiated, the Anglo-Catholic will remain unmoved; he will merely answer that the development was a true one.

Our author lays stress on his method, which is to interpret the early Church by the cultus (*i.e.* the Eucharist) and not by literary documents. The cultus is the conservative element in the Church. He examines the ancient liturgies, and especially those parts which are out of harmony with the general tendency. These are retained from motives of conservatism and show us an earlier stage of development. He checks his results by the stereotyped phrases of early writers, which, when not biblical quotations, are almost certainly of liturgical origin.

The first chapter deals with the "Epiphany" of the Lord. In the Liturgy of St. James after the Little Entrance comes an ἐκφώνησις [33]:* "For Thou art holy, O Lord our God, and dwellest and restest among the saints (ἐν ἁγίοις) and to Thee do we attribute the glory and the trishagion hymn, to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit now and always and for ever." The singers answer: "Holy God, holy

* The numbers in square brackets refer to the pages of Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western.*

mighty One, holy immortal One, have mercy upon us [35]." This phrase appears on Egyptian ostraka addressed to Christ, so that the Trinitarian formula is a later addition, a conclusion borne out by the Liturgy of the Syrian Jacobites [77], where the three "holies" each end with "who wast crucified for us." Original hymns addressed to Christ were therefore altered to become Trinitarian. So in the Cherubic hymn Christ comes attended by angels, and in the Anaphora the Sanctus and Benedictus are cries of the angels in which the faithful join. The same is true of the Egyptian rite [116 *ff.*].

These phrases do not suit their present context and go back to earlier ideas, in which the consecrated elements are subordinate to the Coming of the Lord to a meal with His own. *Cf.* the Great Entrance in the Byzantine Mass of the Presanctified [348]. "Now the powers of heaven worship with us invisibly. For behold the King of Glory enters. . . . With faith and fear let us approach that we may become partakers of eternal life." Similar examples are given from the Armenian and Nestorian Liturgies. "The Lord comes to His Church, His heavenly armies accompany Him, and this Parousia or Epiphany of His is greeted by the faithful with praise and song—these are the ideas which confront us clearly enough in them" (p. 11). The original force of "The Lord be with you," which comes in the Roman Mass as an introduction to the Mass of the Faithful, is seen in the very primitive Syriac version of The Testament of our Lord Jesus Christ—"then let the bishop say . . . with an awed voice, *Our* Lord be with you." The presence of Christ was manifested at this point, it is the Maranatha (*our* Lord come) of the Didache. The victory song of the angels is the nucleus from which the prayer reciting the saving acts of Christ has grown.

Very significant is the old custom represented later by the "prayer of the veil." The veil round the apse was removed, and Christians could by a charisma *see* the heavenly worship in which they were joining.* Later the veil surrounds the altar, or only the elements; "fear and trembling" at the removal of the veil from the chalice and paten refer to the offering of the sacrifice. But the original idea was the coming of the Dying and Rising Lord. This Epiphany in the cult was once hardly distinguishable from the eschatological Parousia, as we can see in the Didache. The phrase ὁ ἐν ἁγίοις ἀναπαυόμενος originally meant the Lord abiding with His comrades at the feast. In a sentence, the Eucharist was once Christocentric as in Pliny:† it became an offering of Christ to God, with prayers addressed to the Father.

In Chapter II. the main Eucharistic prayer is discussed, the Anaphora of the Eastern liturgies, introduced by a command to thank God and the answer "it is very meet etc." (a phrase taken over from Jewish sources). There were two pure types. In (*a*) the beneficent acts of God are recounted; (*b*) is Christocentric, concerned with the saving acts of Christ. Neither of the two types has arisen from the other. They appear side by side in the Clementine Liturgy of the Apostolic Constitutions, where the second part of the Anaphora is Christocentric.

* *Cf.* Chrysostom, 1 *Cor.* xxxvi. 6 (X. 340 E), καὶ σὺ τοίνυν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καιροῦ τοῦ φρικώδους ἐκείνου διανάστηθι καὶ πρὶν ἰδεῖν τὰ παραπετάσματα ἀναστελλόμενα καὶ τὸν χόρον τῶν ἀγγέλων προβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀνάβαινε τὸν οὐρανόν· ἀλλ' ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ὁ ἀμύητος. So Ignatius according to Socrates had a vision of angels at the Eucharist, and many monks are said by the *Historia Monachorum* to have enjoyed this privilege.

† Christo carmen quasi deo dicere secum invicem.

Type (*a*) will be of Jewish origin with Christian interpolations; type (*b*) is specially Christian, a celebration of the Death and Resurrection of the Christian cult-God. It is impossible to discover one original form of the Liturgy, for the variations go back to the time when the prophets gave thanks as they wished. But the centre of the Liturgy is a hymn in which Christ's acts are remembered and He is praised. He is present, accompanied by angels. They praise Him because He is mighty, immortal, has left heaven, become man, suffered, died, and risen, for the sake of the initiates who are gathered round Him and glorify Him with the heavenly host. What happened then, happens now anew.* The Apostles' Creed has arisen from this complex of ideas, the Odes of Solomon presuppose it, as do the Epistles of Ignatius and St. Paul. "When Paul speaks of the Cross, of the Gospel of the Cross, he sees before him the drama which was enacted every Sunday in the cultus of the Church" (p. 47).

Chapter III. deals with the Words of Institution and the Anamnesis. In most Eastern liturgies the Anaphora ends with the Words, followed by the Anamnesis and Epiclesis. In the Western Liturgy the Epiclesis is absent, and before the fifth century there are only vague traces of it in the Western Fathers. In *de Sacramentis* and St. Augustine the Words of Institution form the Consecration. In the East the Words of Institution are absent occasionally, as in the Nestorian Liturgy, some Armenian texts, and a Persian fragment. Elsewhere they seem to be interpolated into an older scheme. Thus in the Clementine Liturgy they follow the Ascension [20]. In the Armenian [436, 437] they come between the Cross and the Descent into Hell. The inference is that they were not originally connected with the hymn of victory in which Christ's saving acts were recited. The stages are these: (1) the hymn exists without the Words of Institution; (2) the Words are added as the authority for the rite;† (3) the centre of gravity shifts to the Words.

At this point Professor Wetter emphasizes the analogy between the nucleus of the Liturgy and the mystery cults. Both have the same technical terminology—*memores*,‡ καταγγέλλειν, *representare* ("shew forth"). See especially Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiri*, and Lucian on the Attis-mysteries, where sufferings are commemorated. The tendency of the mysteries was for the imitating—commemorating—to take the form of spiritual service (λογικὴ λατρεία) rather than that of processions or dramatic representations. So the formulæ of the Eucharist are essentially an *act*, and ποιεῖν and πράσσειν are the verbs regularly employed.§

Professor Wetter's treatment of the Epiclesis may be introduced by a quotation from Duchesne's *Christian Worship* (p. 48). "After the Eucharist, certain inspired persons began to preach and make manifest before the assembly the presence of the spirit which animated them. . . .

* *Cf.* Armenian Liturgy [436]. Jesus is present. "He it is that distributed and Himself is distributed in the midst of us without being consumed"—*i.e.*, His death takes place in the Eucharist. In the *Liturgical Homilies of Narsai* we read: "Let us see Jesus who is being led to death on our account. On the paten and in the cup He goes forth with the deacon to suffer."

† *Cf.* W. C. Bishop in *Church Quarterly Review*, 1908, p. 392. "The Words of Institution were not recited as of themselves effecting the consecration, but rather as the authority in obedience to which the rite is performed."

‡ The Anamnesis of the Liturgy cannot be taken as = "remembering." In the light of parallels it must = "commemoration."

§ *Cf. actio* of the Roman Canon

There was, as it were, a Liturgy of the Holy Ghost after the Liturgy of Christ, a true Liturgy with a Real Presence and Communion." Probably our author would accept this description if *after* could be altered to *at*. He points out that the Epiclesis is twofold, referring now to the worshippers, now to the elements. The former is the earlier idea. The two thoughts mingle in the Gregorian Liturgy: "Mitte super *nos* gratiam Spiritu tui sancti, qui sanctificet et transferat haec dona proposita in corpus et sanguinem salutis nostræ." The present Oriental Masses represent the Body and Blood as being on the altar immediately after the Epiclesis. Once the Lord was greeted as present without direct connection with the elements. The Spirit was "prayed down" upon the initiates.* Certain old liturgies (Armenian etc.) speak of Christ sitting at the altar. "Ye who with faith stand before the holy royal table, see the King Christ sitting and surrounded with the heavenly hosts" [434]. The Emmaus-story exactly reproduces the atmosphere of the primitive Eucharist. The vagueness of the ideas is aptly illustrated by a Persian papyrus [515]: "Reliquit in manibus nostris pignus corporis sui sancti, ut de propinquo esset nobiscum per corpus suum et omni tempore se nobis immisceret per virtutem suam."

The results of the investigation so far are summed up as follows:

Jesus descends into the bread and wine and fills them with His glory and power. The Logos penetrates and transfigures their substance. As the Logos once took form on earth through the Virgin, so now He takes bodily form in bread and wine. The initiates are united with Christ, and thereby with one another. "To sit at table with Christ, to be united to Him, to be among the initiates, means, as in all mysteries, the deification of the initiates" (p. 84). The difference between the primitive and the later ideas is this: "Instead of active laity who are filled with the Spirit and speak with tongues, see God and praise Him for His salvation, the Bishop comes forward as the mediator between God and man. . . . In the old masses the chief thing is the *κοινωνία* with the Lord . . . now an irrational (*sinnlos*) miracle is the central point of the Mass—the magical change of the elements. . . . God does not appear, He *is* here, made by the Epiclesis. The alteration is important. Perhaps nothing better illustrates the difference between primitive Christianity and the Catholic Church" (p. 88).

Results thus attained are checked and corroborated by the early writings of the Church, especially the Apocryphal Acts, Clement of Alexandria, I. Clement, and St. Ignatius. We cannot do more than allude to these interesting investigations. The Fourth Gospel agrees with what has been said. The final discourses come where the Last Supper comes in the Synoptists and are definitely Eucharistic. Jesus is the "mystagogue." The Ignatian epistles mark the transition between the life depicted in the Pauline writings and that of the liturgies. "The voice of the mysteries speaks unmistakably from his letters. The obscure, almost unintelligible phrases, the veiled speech, the ecstasy that frequently breaks out, the often glowing mysticism with which the initiate yearns to become united to this present God, to enter into His death, all these are facts which have already met us above in the Christian mysteries and even in the Hellenistic cults they are found in rich profusion. The Eucharist is a rite (*Weihe*), a mystery of Christ's death, not

* In the Liturgies of Serapion and St. Mark there is a Logos-Epiclesis.

in the first place a participation in His Body and Blood" (p. 123). An interesting point is made in connection with Justin Martyr. He knows where the Christians get their conception of bread and wine as the Body and Blood of Christ, namely from the Memoirs of the Apostles. He could hardly have expressed himself so, if the Words of Institution had occurred in the liturgy known to him.

Returning to the New Testament,* Wetter discusses John vi. "Jesus is represented as the priest, who dies in a real historical sense before His people, and explains His death to them as the true mystery, into which they must be initiated in order to be saved" (p. 145). He *comes* down from heaven (present tense). He dies, rises, and *ascends* (v. 62)—in each Eucharist. It is as if we heard the priest's words explaining the mystery—"This is the bread. . . ."† Like St. John, St. Paul is definitely Sacramental. All the thoughts of the Liturgies are present in him in germ. He apparently first saw the *announcing* of the death of Christ in the Eucharist, and laid stress on the wine which symbolized His blood. But in his time the service was "pneumatic." Anyone with the Spirit, seeing visions, speaking with tongues, etc., could be a leader. Later the prophets tried to maintain their position but the weight of authority was against them. The Pastoral Epistles (probably), Clement and Ignatius all took the other side. The Egyptian Church Order records a stage when the bishop was expected to pray in his own words, but was tolerated if he learned a prayer by heart. The enthusiastic character of the original Eucharist and the ecstatic cries of the worshippers are preserved to-day in such fragments as "Hosanna," "Blessed is He that cometh. . . ."

To sum up. The Eucharist is a *complexio oppositorum*. It has Jewish elements but they are not of prime importance. The service was made by that which it had in common with the Hellenistic mysteries. Jesus had founded it and told His followers to remember Him in it. "The cultus is therefore the service ordered by God Himself. It is a remembrance of historical facts. *This is true.* . . . However, the Eucharist would never have been so formed as it now is, nor would the prayers have been so formulated as now, if this alone had been the motive at its origination" (p. 182). The celebration of the death and victory of the cult-God was united with a meal in which the poor were fed and at which the food was brought by the faithful to the president. Originally this was a preparation for the Eucharistic feast proper. At the end of the second century Jewish influences asserted themselves. The laity are pressed back. The priests bring in the elements in solemn procession. The elements are offered to God after being turned into Christ's Body and Blood. The Presence descends no longer on the worshippers but on the elements. The Cult is transformed. It now means "to bring to God an offering pleasing to Him, that He may be gracious to us, no more in the first instance to show forth the death of Christ." The Sacrifice of the Mass now confronts us; the author hopes to write a further book on this aspect of the subject.

To keep the thread of the argument intact, we forbore to notice in its place a brilliant chapter on the martyrs. What has martyrdom to

* The arrangement is not quite clear at this point.

† For a radically different interpretation *cf.* the Student Christian Movement *Commentary on St. John*, by R. H. Strachan, who thinks the Gospel was in part a protest against growing sacramentalism.

do with the Eucharist? In the Eucharist the death and resurrection of Christ were celebrated, and the initiate participated in both. But what happened symbolically in the mystery, happened with terrible earnestness in the case of the martyrs. The martyr died on the Cross with Christ. This explains the cult of the relics, which were to the Christians not merely the bodies of the sufferers but the Lord Himself, repeating His sufferings in them as in the mysteries of the Eucharist. Thus Pothinus at Lyons appeared "as if he were Christ Himself" (Eus. *H. E.* V. i. 30), and of Blandina it was said: "They looked on her in her conflict, and beheld with their outward eyes, in the form of their sister, Him who was crucified for them" (*ibid.* 41). The thought appears most clearly in Ignatius. He does not look for a reward, rather he expects to share Christ's glory, as His sufferings, "almost mechanically."* Mark x. 35 *ff.* is the earliest example of the new terminology. Drinking of the cup of Christ and being baptized with His baptism are phrases based on the Sacraments and martyrdom. We are far away from the Jewish idea of the suffering wise man in Wisdom, who bears tribulation for a period to win a lasting reward. Jesus willingly enters upon suffering in order to become the Saviour of the World, and His followers share His experience.†

A little criticism of this fine book must be attempted, though I had rather the task had fallen into the hands of a liturgiologist. For all the facts and quotations one is deeply grateful. The speculations and conclusions are fascinating but of less importance. The inherent weakness of the book lies precisely in this, that Professor Wetter is criticizing the Eucharist *ab extra*. No one in whose life the Eucharist occupied the central place, whether priest or layman, could have ended so good a book with so feeble a conclusion, that about A.D. 200 the Sacrament ceased to be a showing of the Lord's death and became an offering of something to God. He would have known instinctively that it is and always has been both. The human mind cannot dwell on every side of a truth at once. Now one side is emphasized, now another. If something is for a while at the margin, instead of in the centre of, the field of attention, it cannot be contrasted with the central concept in the *entweder . . . oder* fashion.

What about the "waters of Mithraism" with which we started? According to this historian, a radical change took place about A.D. 200, *but from a Hellenistic cult-meal to a rite based largely on Old Testament sacrificial ideas*. The cult-meal is primitive. St. Paul was already immersed in the waters. Wetter is inclined to make the apostle an innovator, but 1 Cor. xi. 23 makes it quite clear that the Eucharistic tradition was received by St. Paul from the apostolic Church. ("I received of the Lord that which I also delivered unto you." "Received" and "delivered" are two events of the same order. "Received"

* Note the Eucharistic reference in Ign. *Rom.* iv. 1: "I am God's wheat," etc.; and vii. 3: "I desire the bread of God . . . and for drink I desire His blood." Martyrdom will be his final Eucharist. The context is entirely concerned with martyrdom.

† A common misconception of the *Quo Vadis* story deserves correction. St. Peter going out from Rome meets Christ, who reveals to him that crucifixion awaits Him. "I go to be crucified again"—*i.e.*, when thou art crucified, I shall suffer in thy person *Cf.* "Saul, why persecutest thou *Me?*" There is no hint of censure upon St. Peter's departure from Rome.

cannot therefore refer to a mystic communication direct from Christ). The Mithraic immersion took place therefore in the first few years of the Church's life, long before any book of the New Testament was written. If we use this argument against Mr. Spurr, it is merely *ad hominem*. Wetter in this matter agrees with nearly all his scientific continental colleagues. As a matter of fact, he and they are inclined to draw comparisons between Christianity and the mysteries which are vitiated by neglect of one tremendous difference: the mysteries were concerned with mythical figures, the Christian cult with Jesus of Nazareth, with whom many of the first worshippers had lived. Nor is sufficient attention paid to the dates of documents, and the possibility that mystery-texts of the Christian era show signs of Christian influence.

Professor Wetter's account of Eucharistic development may prove to be right in its main outlines. The process is just what one would expect and corresponds closely with the evolution of Trinitarian dogma. In both cases the early conceptions were vague, even naïve, and by the fourth century definiteness was attained. The Arian controversy taught the Church its own mind as regards the relation of the Son to the Father. But for many centuries there was no controversy about the Eucharist. That a radical change took place in the cult about A.D. 200 without apparently causing a ripple on the water is incredible. If we accept Wetter's facts, they seem capable of a simple explanation. The early Gentile Church was strongly anti-Judaic and, being composed of converts to whom Hellenistic cult-meals were familiar, it naturally laid stress on those aspects which were most congenial to them. After the second destruction of Jerusalem, all danger from Judaizing passed away, and the Church, which after all had received the Gospel from Jews, made far more use of Old Testament ideas as regards priesthood and sacrifice, *thus reverting to type*.

Some practical reflections may conclude a lengthy and in places technical review.

(i.) If the Words of Institution were not originally used, one phrase of the "Lambeth Quadrilateral" becomes doubtful, so far as the Eucharist is concerned—"the unfailing use of the Words of Institution."* Strictly speaking, the Words of Institution are not known, and those so called accompanied our Lord's *administration*, at least according to the Synoptic Gospels.

(ii.) The one constant feature of the primitive rite, the recital of the saving Acts of Christ, is absent from the English Prayer Book.

(iii.) Professor Wetter's study gives rise to many thoughts of great devotional value, which might well find a place in our popular manuals. Mrs. J. K. Mozley in her *Eucharistic Fellowship* (Mowbray 4d.) has made a modest beginning, but in the main the treasures remain unused.

(iv.) We cannot resuscitate the Liturgy of the primitive Church. For good or evil we must be Westerners. But the rich variety of interpretation which the Eucharist has received in the course of the centuries is a warning against rigorism in our teaching.

W. K. L. CLARKE.

* Not used in 1920.

NOTICES

THE RELIGION OF THE PRIMITIVES. By Most Rev. Alexander le Roy, Superior-General of the Fathers of the Holy Ghost. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 10s.

The author of this book has dedicated it to the numerous Christian missionaries scattered among the primitive peoples. Not only has he made a thorough study of the writings of men of various schools of thought which deal with this subject, but, what is far more important, from the year 1877 to 1893 he lived and worked amongst primitive peoples in East Africa and from 1893 onwards among primitive peoples on the West Coast of Africa. Having thus combined careful study with very many years of experience gained by close contact with and intimate knowledge of such peoples, his conclusions carry great weight and are of profound interest not only to Christian missionaries, but also to anthropologists and to all concerned with the science of comparative religions.

It is a subject which is of prime importance to missionaries, because, as the author remarks in his preface, "everyone proposing to lead his fellow-men to his own faith, must first of all know what they believe." This book will enable the missionary in East Africa to begin his labours with a sound and comprehensive knowledge of the leading religious ideas of the African races.

Again, the author tells us that often his observations, made and controlled on the spot, were found to disagree with the generalizations of well-known authors who are cited as oracles. He advises us to put facts before theories, and to be on our guard against conclusions which have been arrived at by a process of selecting the facts which support a particular theory and ignoring other facts which point in a different direction.

A glance at the subjects dealt with will show the comprehensive nature of the contents of the book. The Primitive in the Presence of Nature; the Primitive and the Family; Belief, Morality, Worship, Magic, comparisons of the Religions of the Primitives—all these subjects, as the reader will discover if he reads the book with the close attention which it deserves, are considered in the light of actual facts and first-hand experience. Everyone who knows something of the African is aware that you can only find out the real nature of his ideas and beliefs first, by acquiring a thorough knowledge of his methods of self-expression; this is the key to sympathy. And secondly, by listening and not questioning. This necessitates living among the people as the author did. Probably the worst way of trying to glean information on these subjects is to arm yourself with the printed list of questions drawn up by anthropological societies and then bombard the African with them. Commit the questions to memory and then watch and listen. In time you will discover what you want to know and can make your notes. This is what the author has done, and it is precisely because he has done it that his book is so valuable. What, for instance, could be more valuable to the missionary than the careful list of distinctions between religion and magic on pp. 306 and 307? What more interesting than his conclusion, that myths, superstitions, and magic, so far from constituting the origins of African religion, are later accretions which vitiated it, disfigured it and turned

it from its object? We can cordially commend this book to African missionaries. Every Missionary Society should have a copy in its office, and Missionary Colleges may well add it to the list of books to be studied by those who are training for mission work in Africa.

GODFREY DALE.

THE SEPARATION OF THE MONOPHYSITES. By W. A. Wigram, D.D., pp. xviii + 210. The Faith Press. 7s. 6d.

As early as the year 1839 Newman was beset—we know it from a letter written to Henry Wilberforce eleven years later—with a fear that the English Church was in a position comparable to that of the Monophysites. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the circumstances of the nineteenth century were not precisely those of the sixth or seventh, for he was living, as he said, with the Fathers, and it probably confined his reading to the orthodox of their day. Dr. Wigram has lived among the Monophysites, so called, of to-day, and he has read their Fathers as well as those of the Dyophysites. He thus writes with full knowledge of that disastrous schism. The superficial resemblance which struck Newman is evident in his pages. The schism was in a great measure political. The nationalism, if we should not rather call it the provincialism of Egypt, was in arms against the ecclesiastical dominance of Constantinople, consolidated by the Council of Chalcedon; a similar provincialism became operative later in the Orient, and in Armenia there was a genuine nationalism. The part played by the Church of Rome, as noted by Newman, adds to the resemblance. Rome stood firmly by Chalcedon, or, perhaps, rather by the Tome of St. Leo which Chalcedon had accepted, and would not tolerate any modification of the definition of the Two Natures. Dr. Wigram shows how the vacillating policy of the Emperors, who intervened now on this side, and now on that, and sometimes in a purely irenic sense, was affected by this insistence. They wished to pull the eastern part of the Empire together, but they cared even more for their precarious foothold in the elder Rome and in Italy. Dr. Wigram himself is firm on the doctrine; he allows the necessity of the Chalcedonian definition; he sees that the true Monophysites, the Eutychians, destroyed the reality of our Lord's humanity; but he sees also that for others the controversy was concerned rather with words than with realities, rather with localities and personalities than with the truth. He finds as much Christianity, and as little, on one side as on the other, and the great leaders on both sides equally respectable. No orthodox patriarch of Constantinople was a finer example of the Christian pastorate than Severus of Antioch. He ends with a startling suggestion. On the basis of *Quicunque vult* the two parties subsisting in the East might be reconciled.

T. A. LACEY.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER.